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The European Union and in particular the Netherlands Environmental Assessment 
Agency (PBL) believe that in order to effectively mitigate the dangers of climate change, 
atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations must be stabilized at 450 ppm CO2 equiva-
lent by 2050. It is assumed that this can only be achieved through a unified global effort 
that involves binding – even though differentiated – targets and commitments from all 
major nations. To that end the EU and PBL advocate that the most environmentally ef-
fective agreement is in the form of a ‘grand coalition’. Reaching this type of agreement, 
however, has so far been difficult. Countries remain locked into their negotiating posi-
tions, making the prospect of a ‘grand coalition’ agreement tenuous. These negotiating 
positions are largely based on how countries politically perceive the issue of climate 
change, for example as a threat or as an opportunity. These perceptions are rooted in the 
social, political and economic circumstances of a country. Thus, if one can better under-
stand what drives these perceptions, certain ‘leverage points’ could be identified that 
help appeal to the social and economic interests of a country and shift their political will 
towards accepting a multi-stage, ‘grand coalition’ agreement. 
This report takes the first step in attempting to identify these leverage points by building 
profiles of the major countries involved in the post-2012 debate: China, India, South Af-
rica, Brazil, Russia, Mexico, and the United States. In these profiles we explore how 
each country perceives the three dominant socio-political factors that have underscored 
the climate negotiations since their inception: 
1. Justice and equity—most countries perceive taking action on climate change as fun-
damentally rooted in issues of equity and will not take action unless their equity con-
cerns are addressed; 
2. Opportunity—countries may see climate change as not only a problem, but also as an 
opportunity to fulfil their own social and economic interests by agreeing to take ac-
tion in return for resources from other countries; 
3. Affectedness—while some countries perceive climate change as a real and present 
threat to their own and others’ livelihoods and institutions and believe that it calls for 
a negotiated solution and immediate policy intervention, others are sceptical of how 
they will be affected and see only a limited value in negotiations and policy interven-
tions. 
Below we briefly summarize some of the findings that have emerged from our profiles 
on these issues. 


Perceptions of affectedness appear to be important in all of our case countries with the 
exception of Russia. Interestingly, however, affectedness is addressed differently, with 
some countries focussing on environmental affectedness (such as Mexico) and others de-
fining affectedness stronger in economic terms (such as the United States). For others, 
the science of understanding climate vulnerabilities is limited or research is just begin-
ning, putting them in the position of greater uncertainty. Thus perceptions are not neces-
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sarily derived from their own experience. In this case we may think especially of India 
and to some degree China. 


The perception of justice and equity is probably the most straightforward perception to 
emerge from our country profiles. Three aggregate issues can be distilled to help eluci-
date this perception: issues of sovereignty, as with the case of Brazil and their reluctance 
to involve issues of the Amazon in the negotiations; issues of economic protection and 
gain, as is the case with Mexico’s oil industry or China’s (and to some degree India’s) 
rapidly growing economy; and issues of scientific uncertainty of how vulnerable a coun-
try is to climate change. These issues then feed the perceptions that each actor is in some 
degree being asked to do more than they perceive is fair or just.  

Unlike the perceptions of affectedness and justice and equity, the perception of opportu-
nity is perhaps the most difficult to generalize across countries. While it can be stated 
that for the majority of countries, perceptions of opportunity revolve around opportuni-
ties of financial or material gain, the perception on how these gains would be achieved 
varies. Moreover, beyond material gain there is the implicit (and sometimes explicit) ex-
pression of political opportunity to be realized within negotiations. This enhancement of 
political opportunity naturally feeds into the capitalization on material opportunity. 
China, for example, portrays itself as a ‘leader’ of the G77 and to that end attempts fre-
quently to set the negotiation agenda with what it (and others) see as the most salient is-
sues; technology transfer being most prominent. Brazil also takes on the mantle of 
‘leader’ of South America, given its size and economy.  





While the 2007 Conference of Parties meeting in Bali, Indonesia and the ensuing ‘Bali 
Roadmap’ were a successful first step in the formal negotiating process on a post-2012 
climate agreement (by defining four key building blocks of the future climate regime), 
speculation remains on what any new agreement might look like and how it will be 
achieved. The European Union and in particular the Netherlands Environmental Assess-
ment Agency believe that in order to effectively mitigate the dangers of climate change, 
greenhouse gas concentrations must be stabilized at 450 ppm CO2 equivalent by 2050. 
This, however, can only be achieved through a unified global effort that involves binding 
– even though differentiated – targets and commitments from all major countries (see 
also MNP, 2006). To that end they are advocating that the most environmentally effec-
tive agreement is in the form a of a ‘grand coalition’ built upon the so-called multi-stage 
approach whereby all countries over time take on ever increasing mitigation commit-
ments based on national circumstances and economic development.  
Much research has been undertaken by PBL to highlight the theoretical effectiveness and 
flexibility of this approach as compared to other existing post-2012 proposals as well as 
detailing the greenhouse gas mitigation commitments required. Nevertheless, questions 
remain as to whether countries will be politically willing to make those commitments. 
We know from international relations theory that it is almost impossible to force a coun-
try into an international agreement as countries do not act out of altruism, but that such 
agreements need to be compatible with their social and economic interests. Furthermore, 
there needs to be political will and perhaps, in the case of climate change, a certain de-
gree of scientific certainty before accepting international commitments. Thus despite the 
success in Bali, countries still remain entrenched in their negotiating positions, making 
the prospect of a grand coalition agreement doubtful. These negotiating positions are 
largely based on how countries politically perceive the issue of climate change, for ex-
ample as a threat or as an opportunity. These perceptions are rooted in the social, politi-
cal and economic circumstances of a country. If we can better understand what drives 
these perceptions (vis-à-vis climate change), there is the possibility that certain ‘leverage 
points’ could be identified for individual countries that could help appeal to their social 
and economic interests and thereby help shift their political will towards accepting a 
multi-stage, grand coalition agreement. 
 
 
In this initial report we attempt to create profiles of the dominant socio-political (and to 
some degree economic) issues and factors that drive the climate change negotiat-
ing/policy positions of the most dominant countries involved in the post-2012 debate: 
Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Russia, South Africa and the United States. We hope that 
at a later stage these profiles will serve to inform possible leverage points for future ne-
gotiations.  
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The country profiles are presented in two main parts and are constructed as follows. In 
the opening sections we attempt to first highlight the important socio-economic indica-
tors that define and characterize a country with respect to the issue of climate change 
mitigation. These include, inter alia, GDP, total primary energy supply, and CO2 emis-
sions. Second, we outline the domestic and international institutional aspects that relate 
to climate change, including domestic policies and international commitments. Third, we 
attempt to detail the physical as well social vulnerabilities of the country to current and 
projected climate change, show how the countries outwardly frame the issue of climate 
change, and detail potential opportunities that undertaking climate change mitigation ef-
forts might offer. We also attempt to offer an objective view of the countries’ negotiating 
strategies and positions within the framework of the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (UNFCCC).  
The concluding part of the profiles takes a more subjective view where we try to inter-
pret the empirical socio-political and economic facts through the lens of how we believe 
the country interprets or perceives those facts. In this way we are looking for the gaps in 
what the physical and social ‘reality’ is and what the countries’ impressions are. We 
have done this by creating a policy perception framework (detailed below) that covers 
the three dominant socio-political issues that underpin the negotiation on climate change: 
1. The perception of justice and equity—countries perceive taking action on climate 
change as fundamentally rooted in issues of equity and will not take action unless 
their issues of equity are addressed; 
2. The perception of opportunity—countries may see climate change as not only a prob-
lem, but also as an opportunity to fulfil their own social and economic interests by 
agreeing to take action in return for resources from other countries; 
3. The perception of affectedness—countries perceive climate change as a real and pre-
sent threat to their own and others’ livelihoods and institutions and believe that it 
calls for a negotiated solution and immediate policy intervention. Conversely, other 
countries are sceptical of how they will be affected and see only a limited value in 
negotiations and policy interventions. 
All of the countries profiled in this report follow this schematic save for the United 
States. In the case of the US, because of their pivotal, polarizing and well-publicized role 
within the climate debate, we have sought to take a more discursive approach from the 
outset preferring to focus more on their perceptions.  
% &

It should be noted that while we attempt to give an overall picture of climate related ac-
tivities in our case countries, we focus primarily on mitigation. To be sure, adaptation to 
climate change is an important issue within countries and the UNFCCC negotiations, es-
pecially the discussion of adaptation funding. We nevertheless feel that an investigation 
of the socio-political dimensions surrounding adaptation would require a separate study. 
Secondly, any investigation of negotiating positions would ideally require in depth inter-
views of country negotiators and government officials. Where possible this had been 
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Overall the report is structured as follows. Following the introduction we outline in more 
detail the policy perception framework further defining what is to be understood from 
the concepts of equity, opportunity and affectedness (Chapter 2). We then outline in brief 
the evolution and current state of the post-2012 international negotiations under the 
UNFCCC from the 11th Conference of the Parties in Montreal until the conference in 
Bali (Chapter 3). This discussion is followed by our country profiles (Chapters 4-10). 
The report concludes with a cross comparison of the perceptions of each country as well 
as recommendations for future research (Chapter 11). 




How a country perceives the issue of climate change and its ensuing international discus-
sions shapes how that country has and will continue to act within the negotiations on a 
post-2012 climate regime. The three dominant socio-political issues that have emerged 
in this study thus far appear to revolve around issues of justice and equity, opportunity, 
and affectedness. Understanding how a country perceives these issues will help to eluci-





For large developing countries, issues of justice and equity have long been at the core of 
the climate debate relating to issues of historical liability and the polluter pays principle. 
We see the issue as two-fold: the socio-economic concerns more narrowly related to cli-
mate change mitigation, and deep-seated issues more broadly related to the social and 
political history of a country. 
Direct socio-economic concerns: Many countries are reluctant to undertake mitigation 
efforts; especially developing countries as they see what is being asked of them is unfair. 
Or they are reluctant because they see unilateral mitigation efforts as leading to lower 
competiveness in the international market. We try to thus identify the core issues for 
each country in this category, exploring what they see in the current status of the nego-
tiations as inequitable. 
Broader deep-seated concerns: Issues of justice and equity are not always related 
purely to narrow negotiation issues. Generally, there are other underlying factors that 
contribute to a country’s perception that the negotiations are inequitable, based perhaps 
on their social history in relation to other countries. This may be particularly so for coun-
tries that were formerly colonies or that had a divisive social history. We attempt, where 
applicable, to highlight these issues.  
 (

Many countries are opportunistic when it comes to the climate change debates. In this in-
stance we try to pinpoint and highlight the issues or areas where each country thinks it 
can benefit in terms of 1) improving its own economic and political position owing to 
specific mechanisms of climate policy; and 2) improving its own economic and political 
position in areas outside climate governance. 
Opportunities for a country to benefit within climate policy: Here one may think 
primarily of technology transfer that will help a country in its mitigation efforts or the 
creation of markets that will help sell its technologies.  
Opportunities outside climate policy: The climate negotiations have become a forum 
for countries to negotiate on a multitude of issues that fall outside climate policy and 
governance (i.e. mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and adaptation), with some 
countries posturing that if they were to receive x, y and z they would be more amenable 
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to taking on more stringent climate policies. These include: better trade relations, the re-
moval of agricultural subsidies, the easing of intellectual property rights, non-climate re-
lated technology transfer, as well as larger political-strategic considerations, for example 
the desire to be perceived as a major power that takes on ‘global responsibilities’, or the 




The perception of affectedness revolves around how and to what degree a country per-
ceives that it, and others, will be affected by climate change, both in terms of environ-
mental changes and in terms of political or economic harm (which can include harm 
from mitigation policies as well as harm from climate change). Determining these factors 
can help gauge the degree to which a country will take on climate policies. The rationale 
is that if a country does not believe it will be affected the less it will do; or the more that 
the other perceptions of equity and opportunity come into play. For example, one could 
posit that the US does not have a high perception of affectedness (being rather sceptical), 
thus to get this country to engage in negotiations and implement climate policies within a 
grand bargain, the EU would need to appeal more to their perception of opportunity 
and/or equity. We thus look at two factors:  
Climate affectedness: To what degree do countries believe they or others will be af-
fected? Is this a major concern for them? Moreover, how is climate affecting a country’s 
perception of external justice, in the sense that they might be the cause of an environ-
mental crisis? 
Political affectedness: How and to what degree is climate change affecting the political 
institutions in a particular country, if at all?  
In the following chapter we discuss in brief the evolution and current state of the post-
2012 international negotiations under the UNFCCC from the 11th Conference of the Par-
ties in Montreal until the conference in Bali. 
Exploring the Socio-Political Dimensions of Climate Change Mitigation  9
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With the Kyoto Protocol’s rulebook largely in place and implementation having started 
in most countries, the question of how to continue beyond Kyoto’s commitment period 
has become a key issue in current international debate. 
At the eleventh Conference of the Parties (COP-11) to the UNFCCC, serving as the first 
Meeting of the Parties (COP/MOP-1) to the Kyoto Protocol, held in Montréal in Decem-
ber 2005, a first set of small steps was made to discuss and negotiate the future of inter-
national climate governance through the UNFCCC (see, e.g. Bausch & Mehling, 2006; 
Schipper & Boyd, 2006). First, in the context of the UNFCCC, an agreement to start an 
open, non-binding dialogue was reached (UNFCCC, 2006a). Second, discussions on new 
commitments for developed countries were initiated on the basis of Article 3.9 of the 
Kyoto Protocol. In Montréal, it became visible that developing countries still vigorously 
opposed discussing the possibility of commitments, when some parties, including the 
European Union, Canada, and Japan, attempted to broaden the discussion of new com-
mitments for Annex I countries to a review of the Kyoto Protocol (which was due for the 
second COP/MOP). Eventually, the parties agreed to establish an Ad Hoc Working 
Group (AWG) to address the issue of future commitments for Annex I Parties 
(UNFCCC, 2006b).  
The issue of future commitments was once again on the agenda at COP-12 and 
COP/MOP-2, held in Nairobi in November 2006. A decision was taken there to hold the 
review in the context of Article 9 at the fourth COP/MOP in 2008, but that this review 
“shall not lead to new commitments for any Party” (UNFCCC, 2006c). The Nairobi talks 
can be seen then as merely a prelude to the discussions at the following COP and 
COP/MOP in Bali, Indonesia in December 2007. The Bali meeting was significant as it 
presented a crucial moment in the UNFCCC process to set in motion negotiations on a 
follow-up agreement to be concluded before the expiration of the current Kyoto targets. 
Following intense negotiations, parties to the UNFCCC finally adopted a series of deci-
sions together referred to as the “Bali Road Map” (see, for example, Clémençon, 2008). 
The key decision of COP-13 is known as the Bali Action Plan (UNFCCC, 2008a). The 
decision launches “a comprehensive process to enable the full, effective and sustained 
implementation of the Convention through long-term cooperative action, now, up to and 
beyond 2012, in order to reach an agreed outcome and adopt a decision at its fifteenth 
session”. The negotiation process takes place within the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Long-term, Cooperative Action, which will meet more frequently than the COP. The de-
cision avoids any explicit reference to a quantitative elaboration of a long-term objective 
and does not go further than calling for “deep cuts”, referring via a footnote to specific 
pages in the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC). It also does not indicate specific ranges for short- to medium term tar-
gets. Furthermore, the decision leaves open a wide range of possibilities on how a post-
2012 treaty might look, and does not clarify whether such an agreement will include 
binding emission reductions for developing countries. Although there was considerable 
pressure on developing countries to adopt “measurable, reportable and verifiable nation-
ally appropriate mitigation actions”, the developing countries were ultimately able to  
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renegotiate the text such that the term “measurable, reportable and verifiable” is now 
used more in connection with technology financing and capacity building to be provided 
to developing countries to enable them to implement their obligations (Clémençon, 
2008). 
With respect to the Kyoto Protocol, another important document emerging from the Bali 
meeting is the outcome of discussions under the Ad Hoc Working Group established in 
Montréal (UNFCCC, 2008b). Unlike the Bali Action Plan, the AWG report does provide 
an indication of possible ranges for short- to medium targets, stating that achieving low 
greenhouse gas stabilization levels as indicated by the IPCC “would require Annex I Par-
ties as a group to reduce emissions in a range of 25–40 per cent below 1990 levels by 
2020”.  
The Bali Road Map and AWG report provide two tracks on the way to a post-2012 
agreement; one with the United States and one without. It is unclear whether the two 
processes will merge or how they will interact, however it would appear that the parties 
wish to keep all options open at present. 
Exploring the Socio-Political Dimensions of Climate Change Mitigation  11
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Engaging China in the international negotiations on climate change is increasingly im-
portant for two reasons: First, China is already the second highest consumer of energy 
and second largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHGs) (Paredis et al., 2006). Its emis-
sions are increasing steadily, and it is surmised that China may have already surpassed 
the emissions of the United States in 2006 (MNP, 2007). Second, as the world’s largest 
developing country, China has a prominent voice in the United Nations and plays a lead-
ing role within the G77 bloc in the UN climate negotiations (Heggelund, 2007). 
Despite China’s importance, its role as an international actor in climate negotiations is 
not easily characterized. While China ratified the UNFCCC in 1993 and the Kyoto Pro-
tocol 2002, in 2005 they joined the US-led Asia-Pacific Partnership (APP) (Van Asselt, 
2007). However, a closer examination of China’s environmental policies also reveals 
challenges in reducing its emissions growth rate (Jeon & Yoon, 2006).  
In this chapter we will investigate the role of China in the recent post-2012 negotiations. 
The focus will be on the differences and similarities between the actual and perceived af-
fectedness, equity and opportunity. In order to investigate this we first provide a country 
profile with the help of key socio-economic indicators, and indicators related to energy 
and environment. Second, we assess the actual affectedness, the domestic framing of the 
issue and the actual opportunities for climate change mitigation. Third, we give an over-
view of the institutional context, that is, the country’s international and domestic com-
mitments on climate change and energy. Fourth, we examine the recent negotiation 
strategies and positions of China. Finally we summarize the similarities and differences 






The main drivers behind China’s increasing greenhouse gas emissions can be attributed 
to four factors; rapid industrialization, economic growth, increasing urbanization and 
population growth (Paredis et al., 2006). These socio-economic trends are summarized 
in table 4.1. China is officially recognized as a developing country with a per capita GDP 
of US$ 1,713 or US$ 6,757 PPP and a medium ranking of 81 on the human development 
index; 34.9% of the population lives on less than US$ 2 a day. However, if compared to 
three decades ago, when China had a strictly planned economy, the progress made since 
then is astounding. The program of economic restructuring and liberalization set in mo-
tion in 1979 has achieved rapid economic growth and improvements in living standards. 
The annual GDP growth rate in the period 1975-2005 was 8.4%, with growth levels in-
creasing even more in recent years. In comparison to 1990, the imports and exports of 
goods and services as a percentage of GDP increased from 16% to 32% and 19% to 37% 
respectively. The population has grown at a rate of 1.2% in the period 1975-2005, but is 
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projected to decrease by 0.6% towards 2015. An increasing part of the population lives 
in cities where urban population has risen from 17.4% in 1975 to 40.4% in 2005 and is 
projected to approach half of the population (49.2%) by 2015.  
Table 4.1 Overview of selected socio-economic indicators for China (Source: UNDP, 
2007). 
Population 2005 (millions) *1 1,313.0 
Annual population growth rate *1 1.2 (1975-2005) 
0.6 (2005-2015) *2 
Urban population (% of total) *5 17.4% (1975) 
40.4% (2005) 
49.2% (2015) *2 
GDP 2005 2,234.3 (US$ billions) 
8,814.9 (PPP US$ billions) 
GDP per capita 2005 1,713 (US$) 
6,757 (PPP US$) *3 
GDP growth rate (%)  8.4% (1975-2005) 
8.8% (1990-2005) 
Human development index 2005 (# and ranking) 0.777 (ranked 81, medium human develop-
ment) 
Population below 2 USD and 1 USD a day 1990-
2005 (%) *4 
34.9% (below 2 US$ a day) 
9.9% (below 1 US$ a day) 












*1 Population estimates include Taiwan Province of China. 
*2 Data refer to medium-variant projections. 
*3 World Bank estimate based on a bilateral comparison between China and the United States 
(Ruoen and Kai, 1995). 
*4 Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified. 
*5 Because data are based on national definitions of what constitutes a city or metropolitan 
area, cross-country comparisons should be made with caution.  
% $#
The above socio-economic trends have contributed to one of the greatest carbon foot-
prints in the world. Looking at the total emission, China is the second highest consumer 
of energy and second largest emitter of GHGs. The United Nations Development Pro-
gramme projects that China will become the largest GHG emitter within this decade. 
Figure 4.1 depicts the projection of the emissions without mitigation. 
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Figure 4.1 Business-as-usual CO2 emissions on a rising trend (Source: IEA, 2006 in 
UNDP, 2007: 56). 
On a per capita basis, however, the Chinese emission of GHGs remains low when com-
pared to developed countries (China = 3.8; OECD = 11.5; US = 20.6 t CO2 p.c.). How-
ever, while China is getting wealthier the electricity consumption per capita is increasing 
rapidly with already a 212.4% change in the period 1990-2004. Currently, CO2 emis-
sions are increasing annually with 7.8%. 
Table 4.2 Overview of selected energy and environment indicators for China (Source: 
UNDP, 2007). 
Electricity consumption per capita in kWh 1,684 (2004) 
212.4 (% change 1990-2004) 




CO2 emissions 2004 (Mt CO2) 5,007.1 (2004) 
2,398.9 (1990) 
7,8% annual change 
CO2 per capita (t CO2) 3.8 (2004) 
2.1 (1990) 




*1 Total primary energy supply (TPES) is made up of ‘indigenous production + imports –  
exports - international marine bunkers ± stock changes’. TPES is a measure of commercial 
energy consumption. In some instances, the sum of the shares by energy source may not sum 
up to 100% because pumped storage generation has not been deducted from hydroelectricity 
generation. 
In addition to increased electricity consumption, China’s strong dependence on coal 
(63% of TPES) is another factor that will contribute to future emissions (see Figure 4.2). 
The sectoral GHG emissions stem primarily from electricity generation, heating, manu-
facturing and industrial processes (see Figure 4.3). The transport sector, currently  
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responsible for only 6% of the GHG emission, will likely grow dramatically as cars be-

































Figure 4.3 Chinese GHG emissions by sector in 2004 (excludes land use change) 





China can be characterized as highly vulnerable to climate change. In late 2006, the Chi-
nese government released the first ‘National Assessment Report on Climate Change’ de-
veloped under the auspices of 20 governmental departments (Erda et al., 2007). The 
study on the impacts focuses in particular on four areas: agriculture, terrestrial ecosys-
tems, water resources, and coastal zones.  
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First, in terms of agriculture, climate change would greatly influence China’s agricultural 
output. Already by 2030, the overall crop productivity could decrease by 5-10%. The 
water demand would grow in most regions of the country because of the increased 
evaporation. Second, in terms of terrestrial ecosystems, the productivity of forests would 
probably not decrease although the structure and composition of forests in northern 
China would change greatly. In semi-arid areas desertification would gain momentum. 
Regional warm weather and sea-level rise would lead to reduced wetland area, biodiver-
sity loss and increasing number of endangered species. In the next 50 years the areas of 
surface permafrost in the Tibetan Plateau could be reduced by 10-15%. Climate change 
would also accelerate the shrinking of inland lakes. Third, in terms of water resources, 
climate change could decrease river runoff in northern China and increase in southern 
China. The probability of droughts and floods would decrease, destabilizing water re-
source distribution. The total area of China’s western glaciers is projected to decrease by 
27.2%. Fourth, the rise in sea-level (by 0.01-0.16 m in 2030) in densely populated 
coastal regions will spur disasters such as storm surges, droughts and extreme weather. 
Aside from these four main impact areas, climate change could also result in a higher 





As stated above, China is an active party in the international negotiations on climate 
change and a leader in G77- China Group. Its statements at the Seminar of Government 
Experts (SoGE) and at the G8 Gleneagles Summit held in 2005 make clear that China is 
willing to play an active role in the post-2012 climate regime. China has entered into 
multilateral partnerships on climate change mitigation and energy efficiency (IGES, 
2005) and was among the first to ratify the UNFCCC in 1993. It has shown a strong 
commitment to participate in the regime and to comply with international norms. In Au-
gust 2002, it ratified the Kyoto Protocol. However, as a developing country China is not 
bound by quantitative emission reductions targets.  
China has also entered into several bilateral partnerships. Four of these in particular are 
of note: 
1. The EU and China Partnership on Climate Change. The objective of this partnership 
is “to develop and demonstrate, in China and the EU, advanced zero emissions coal 
technology; to significantly reduce the cost of key energy technologies and promote 
deployment and dissemination” (Paredis et al., 2006); 
2. The Asia-Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate. The objective of 
this partnership is “to develop, deploy and transfer cleaner, more efficient technolo-
gies and to meet national pollution reduction, energy security and climate concerns” 
(Paredis et al., 2006: 68); 
3. The US-China Working Group on Climate Change. The objective of this partnership 
is the cooperative research and analysis on areas of non-CO2 gases, eco-
nomic/environmental monitoring, potential consequences of climate change, adapta-
tion and technology; 
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4. The Australia-China Climate Change Partnership. Both parties entered into joint  
activities in the domains of climate change science, policies, impacts, adaptation, 
technology cooperation, capacity building, public awareness and energy efficiency. 
To understand how the Chinese government has addressed the climate issue it is worth a 
brief look at the institutional structure surrounding climate change. Beginning in the 
1980s climate change was first treated strictly as a scientific issue; to that end the State 
Meteorological Administration was given the responsibility of devising policy options 
for international negotiations. In the 1990s, the role shifted to an institution that evolved 
into the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and is also the primary 
authority on energy policy decision-making. Currently, the National Coordination Com-
mittee on Climate Change oversees the climate activities within the NDRC, the Ministry 
of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Environmental 
Protection Administration (SEPA). However, the NDRC and the Foreign Ministry are 






In June 2007, China released its ‘National Climate Change Program’ (NDRC, 2007). 
This report provides a comprehensive synthesis of the current domestic climate policies. 
The policies are not climate policies per se but rather policies implemented throughout 
the economy that have the effect of reducing GHGs. Three policy areas are particularly 
important: 
1. Energy efficiency. The aim of the policy is to quadruple the economic growth in the 
period 2000-2020 while only doubling energy consumption. The plan includes a goal 
to reduce energy intensity by 20% below 2005 levels by 2010. In 2006, a program 
was established to improve energy efficiency of the largest enterprises. The govern-
ment is also making an effort to close down small, inefficient power plants by 2010, 
which in total produce 8% of the country’s energy. The 1997 Energy Conservation 
Law is aimed at increasing energy efficiency in buildings, industry and consumer 
goods. In the transport sector China is implementing fuel economy standards that are 
already higher than Australia, Canada and the US (Lewis, 2007); 
2. Renewable energy. In 2005, China adopted a National Renewable Energy Law that 
sets the target of increasing the amount of renewable sources of primary energy from 
7% to 16% by 2020. For the electricity sector the target is set at 20%. Hydropower is 
projected to more than double by 2020. The solar energy industry is stimulated by 
tax and other incentives (Lewis, 2007); 
3. Industrial policies. China has implemented measures to discourage growth in energy-
intensive industries, such as increased export taxes. At the same time import tariffs 
on energy and resource products have been cut from between 3-6% to 0-3% aiming 
to promote the use of energy-intensive products produced elsewhere.  
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The problem of climate change is framed by China primarily from the historical experi-
ence in modernizing and promoting its economy as well as from its response to pressures 
from developed countries. China’s own perception of equity is formulated in a proclama-
Exploring the Socio-Political Dimensions of Climate Change Mitigation  17
tion that translates as ‘China’s principles and positions on global environmental prob-
lems’. It was issued July 1990 at the 18th meeting of the Environmental Protection 
Commission (EPC) of China’s State Council. The principles are “the responsibility of 
developed countries for global environmental deterioration, the harmony of both envi-
ronmental protection and economic development, the recognition of developing coun-
tries’ right to develop, the sovereign equality of all states, and the need for new and addi-
tional funds for developing countries” (Jeon & Yoon, 2006). China’s responses in the 







The greatest opportunities for mitigation lie in technology development and deployment. 
Priority areas are advanced coal technologies, energy-efficient building technologies, 
clean vehicle technologies and advanced industrial technologies (Lewis, 2007). The suc-
cess of emissions control after Kyoto depends on the success of technology transfer of 
clean energy, wind, solar energy, efficiency technology from developed countries such 
as USA, Germany and Japan to China (Li, 2007). 
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Given China’s large dependence on coal there is a large potential for emission reductions 
through the CDM. At its inception China was sceptical of CDM, seeing it as a mecha-
nism whereby developed countries could escape their mitigation “responsibilities”. 
However, since COP-7 China has become an active supporter of the mechanism and is 
becoming one the most attractive countries for CDM projects. China has the potential to 
generate half of the total worldwide annual Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) of 
Annex I countries. In 2007 China accounted for 21% of the CDM projects, accounting 
for 51% of total CER volume. The areas where CDM will make a difference are also key 
areas of political focus for China: energy, energy efficiency and renewable energy de-
velopment. The CDM potential thus is a promising way for China to reduce its GHG 
emissions (Heggelund, 2007). 
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China’s position in the international climate negotiations rarely deviates from other de-
veloping countries. Their interests are collectively represented in the G77; instead of act-
ing alone and as a result of fears of being singled out because of its increasing economic 
growth, China uses the G77 as buffer while simultaneously taking a leadership role 
(Lewis, 2007). Prior to presenting its position China ensures that they have strong sup-
port within the group. Along with the G77, China emphasizes the historical responsibil-
ity of the developed world in reducing GHG emissions and the great disparity between 
the per capita emissions of the developed and developing countries. 
China resists any binding commitments to reduce its own GHG emissions. In September 
2007, the Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi emphasized that developed countries 
should continue to take the lead in reducing emissions. Despite the fact that the EU is 
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willing to commit to relatively strong post-2012 commitments, as long as the US re-
mains uncommitted to binding targets China will continue to avoid the discussion on 
taking on their own fixed targets (Lewis, 2007). In the ‘National Climate Change Pro-
gram’ released June 2007, China also takes this position by defending the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities. 
According to China “developed countries should fulfil their commitments of taking the 
lead to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and providing financial assistance and 
technology transfer to the developing countries” (NDRC 2007: 59). China also claims to 
participate in regional cooperation but as they claim this ‘should function as a helpful 
complement to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol rather than replacing or weakening 
them’ (NDRC, 2007: 59). 
China is especially keen on technology transfer that includes measures such as “estab-
lishing an effective technology cooperation mechanism to promote R&D, deployment 
and transfer of technology of addressing climate change” as well as “establishing a spe-
cial fund for international technology cooperation so that environment-and-climate-
friendly technologies are accessible and affordable to developing countries” (NDRC 
2007: 59). During the Bali Conference in 2007, China “underscored the urgency of tech-
nology transfer and highlighted a technology transfer fund, cooperation between public 
and private sectors, and the need to consider both climate protection and intellectual 





China’s awareness to its vulnerability to climate change is relatively recent. While cli-
matic changes have already taken place, according to recent Chinese reports the issue of 
vulnerability is not yet perceived as being of major importance in the international cli-
mate negotiations. There is a growing emphasis on economic support for adaptation in 
the international negotiations. China considers that there is a possible linkage between 
climate change and vulnerability of the poor and that their poverty reduction efforts 





China’s own perception of equity formulated in the proclamation ‘China’s principles and 
positions on global environmental problems’ informs its negotiation position. China re-
sists any binding commitments to reduce their own GHG emissions by referring to the 
historical responsibility of the developed countries for global environmental deteriora-
tion. Thus in the perception of China, developed countries must take the lead in reducing 
their greenhouse gas emissions first while at the same time providing financial assistance 
and technology transfer to the developing countries. As long as the US does not commit 
to credible climate policy commitments, China does not perceive it to be just that they 
too must adopt binding commitments.  
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China’s perception of opportunity informs their negotiation position as well. The pri-
mary Chinese institution involved in the international negotiations, NDRC, is responsi-
ble for climate change, energy policy as well as economic development. This is a clear 
indication of the economic importance that is placed on the issue. The trend of involving 
more economists in climate research and directly in the delegation further puts climate 
change into an economic perspective (Heggelund, 2007). 
China justifies its economic growth and the accompanying increase of GHG emissions 
by pointing at the great disparity between the per capita emissions of developing and de-
veloped countries. At the same time it is seeking opportunities and technologies that 
might pose a lesser threat to its economic growth. It is therefore seeking international 
support for a technology transfer mechanism and a special fund for international tech-
nology cooperation. China is hoping to remove itself from the coal energy lock-in by ac-
quiring environmentally friendly technologies with the financial support of developed 
countries. China aims to strengthen its negotiating leverage by leading the developing 
country alliance (G77) and by engaging in two distinct environmental regimes, the 
Kyoto Protocol and the US-led Asia-Pacific Partnership. China will probably remain 
committed to the Kyoto regime if future obligations do not constrain its economic 
growth. Moreover, China will continue to seek more opportunities for technology trans-
fer through the Asia-Pacific Partnership (Jeon & Yoon, 2006).  
 




India is the seventh largest country in the world with a population of over 1.2 billion 
people (second largest population in the world) and has a rapidly growing economy. It is 
a critical actor within the climate change negotiations for three reasons. First, a key sub-
stantive reason is that its rapidly growing economy itself implies a rapid rate of growth 
of greenhouse gas emissions. Second, from a political perspective should India decide to 
follow the lead of the US and ‘go unilateral’, the climate change problem may not be ad-
dressed. Third, the impacts of climate change are likely to be significant on the Indian 
population. If the impacts on water and agriculture are serious and affect human security, 







With a very large population and increasing urbanization, a GDP of US$ 805 billion and 
a per capita income reaching US$ 736, India faces large domestic challenges. Ranked 
128th in the human development index, it has to provide education, water and sanitation 
and health services to a substantial portion of its population. At the same time, sustained 
economic growth and increased demand for goods and services implies that India’s de-
mand for energy will increase rapidly. In 2002, India’s commercial energy supply was 
about 3.4% of world's commercial energy supply and roughly 12% of Asia-Pacific’s en-
ergy consumption and this will change rapidly. Table 5.1 below gives an outline of im-
portant socio-economic indicators. 
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Table 5.1 Overview of selected socio-economic indicators for India. 
Population 2005 (millions) 1,134.4 
Annual population growth rate 2.0 (1975-2005) 
1.4 (2005-2015) *1 
Urban population (% of total) *4 21.3 % (1975) 
28.7 % (2005) 
32.0 % (2015) *1 
GDP 2005 805.7 (US$ billions) 
3,779.0 (PPP US$ billions) *5 
GDP per capita 2005 736 (US$) 
3,452 (PPP US$) *5 
GDP growth rate (%)  3.4 % (1975-2005) 
4.2 % (1990-2005) 
Human development index 2005 (# and ranking) 0.619 (ranked 128, medium human develop-
ment) 
Human poverty index 2005 (# and ranking) 62 
Population below 2 USD and 1 USD a day 1990-
2005 (%) *2 
80.4 % (below 2 US$ a day) 
34.3 % (below 1 US$ a day) 
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 
 
24 % (2005) 
9 % (1990) 
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 
 
21 % (2005) 
7 % (1990) 
ODA received *3 1,724.1 (mln US$ 2005) 
Net FDI inflows (% of GDP 2005) 
 
0.8 % (2005) 
0.1 % (1990) 
Source: UNDP (2007). 
*1 Data refer to medium-variant projections. 
*2 Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified. 
*3 ODA receipts are total net ODA flows from DAC countries as well as Taiwan Province of 
China, Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Poland, Saudi 
Arabia, Slovakia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and other small donors, including Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania. 
*4 Because data are based on national definitions of what constitutes a city or metropolitan 
area, cross-country comparisons should be made with caution.  
*5 World Bank estimate based on regression. 
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The National Communication (GoI, 2004) reveal that India’s emissions of greenhouse 
gases for 1994 – the baseline year - are 65% CO2, 31% from methane, and 4% from ni-
trogen oxide. The energy sector emits 61%, the agricultural sector 28% and the industrial 
processes sector emits 8%, waste 2%, while land use contributes only 1%. Its per capita 
emissions were 0.87 tons of CO2 in 1994. The second National Communication is pres-
ently under preparation.  


















Figure 5.1 India GHG emissions by sector in 2004 (excludes land use change) 
(Source: based on WRI, 2008). 
On the one hand, 487 million people do not have access to electricity in India and on the 
other hand the current population growth rate calls for extremely high electricity growth 
rates for the industry. The government has prioritized both sectors. It aims to meet all ru-
ral energy needs rapidly while also catering to the growing needs of the industrial sector. 
The Accelerated Rural Electrification Programme and Household Modernization and the 
National Electricity Plan aim to increase the per capita electricity consumption from 567 
kWh in 2002-03 to over 1,000 units by 2012. Furthermore, all villages were to be electri-
fied by 2007 and power must be provided by 2012. The National Electricity Policy states 
that a 7.4% growth rate will call for a capacity addition of 91,800 MW in the 11th plan 




















Figure 5.2 India Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES) by source in 2005 
(Source: based on IEA, 2007). 
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The government is thus actively investing in new power plants in its effort to meet urban 
and rural needs (Perkins, 2005, IEA, 2002).1 There is considerable discussion about how 
to choose between coal, nuclear, large hydro plants and renewables (Gupta et al., 2001) 
but many experts feel that the renewables will only be able to provide a small percentage 
of the needs. The government estimates that it needs an investment of about Rs. 800,000 
crores (US$ 182.8 billion; GoI, 2001). Nevertheless, key policies include promoting re-
newable sources of energy, accelerating the growth of hydropower, renewed focus on 
nuclear power, and use of gas and environmental friendly technologies for fossil fuel 
power generation and renovation and modernization of thermal and hydro power plants 
including life extension. 
Table 5.2 Overview of selected energy and environment indicators for India.  
Electricity consumption per capita in kWh 618 (2004) 
77.6 (% change 1990-2004) 
Population without electricity 487.2 (2005) 




CO2 emissions 2004 (Mt CO2) 1,342.1 (2004) 
681.7 (1990) 
6.9 (% annual change) 
CO2 per capita (t CO2) 1.2 (2004) 
0.8 (1990) 
% of world total 4.6 % (2004) 
3.0 % (1990) 
Source: UNDP (2007). 
*1 Total primary energy supply (TPES) is made up of ‘indigenous production + imports – 
 exports - international marine bunkers ± stock changes’. TPES is a measure of commercial 
energy consumption. In some instances, the sum of the shares by energy source may not sum 
up to 100% because pumped storage generation has not been deducted from hydroelectricity 
generation. 
The UNDP projections for India’s energy related CO2 emissions remain relatively mod-
est in relation to that of the European Union, the US and China (see Figure below).  
                                                  
1  For an analysis of the potential impacts of the Electricity Act, see Thakur et al. (2005). 
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The Indian National Communication reveals that the country’s mountain zones are vul-
nerable to glacier melting; the agricultural zone and India’s water resources supply is 
vulnerable to the expected changes in monsoon patterns; this will threaten water and 
food security as well as the local ecosystems; the coastal belt is subject to the challenges 
posed by sea-level rise; and human health problems are expected to be exacerbated as 
vectors shift northwards. Although there is some discussion of the impacts, these have 
neither been quantified, nor integrated into the analysis of potential climate policy. How-
ever, in 2007 a national council was set up with the primary task of investigating this is-
sue. 
What is undoubtedly clear is that India’s existing vulnerability to floods and droughts 
and extreme weather events will be further exacerbated. The challenge of water and food 





India is an active member of the G77 and its policy summits. In general India plays a 
role in shaping the position of the G77 and its own position is shaped by the G77 posi-
tion.  
India is also active within BRIC – a new coalition of Brazil, Russia, India and China. 
According to a Goldman Sachs report of 2003, this group of countries can become the 
globally dominant economic players by 2050, with Brazil and Russia providing key re-
sources to the global community, and China and India being major suppliers of goods 
and services. There are reports of collaboration between these countries and of agree-
ments being made between them however the contents of these reports are not easily or 
readily accessible.  
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India participates in most international treaty negotiations and through several of these 
(FCCC, 1992; CBD, 1992; UNCED, 1992) it has committed itself to the target of sus-
tainable development. Under the various competing international energy regimes, includ-
ing the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA)2, there are no clear obligations for India to choose any specific energy source 
over another. India as a partner in the 2003 International Partnership for a Hydrogen 
Economy is also, passively, according to interviews, exploring the potential for coopera-
tion on hydrogen research (Sindico and Gupta, 2004).  
India ratified the UNFCCC in 1993 and ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002. It has there-
fore undertaken to adopt qualitative policy measures.  
India has also entered into several bilateral and multi-lateral partnerships. These include 
The EU and India Partnership on Climate Change; The Asia-Pacific Partnership for 
Clean Development and Climate and the International Partnership on the Hydrogen 
Economy (as mentioned above). In 1999, a Joint Statement on Cooperation in Energy 
and Related Environmental Aspects was signed by India and the United States. In 2000, 
Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Clinton signed a “Joint Statement on Coopera-
tion in Energy and Environment Between India and the United States”. Several follow-





Before addressing domestic climate policy, it may be useful to briefly discuss India’s in-
stitutional framework. India has more than seventy ministries and responsibilities on the 
various climate change related issues are distributed throughout the different ministries. 
Development issues fall under the National Development Council (consisting of Plan-
ning Commission Members and Chief Ministers from all states) and the Planning Com-
mission. Energy falls under four ministries, the ministries of Power, Non-Conventional 
Energy, Coal and Nuclear Power. Agriculture is governed by the Ministries of Agricul-
ture, Food Processing Industries, Chemicals and Fertilizers; the key ministries engaged 
in water are the Ministries of Water Resources, Power and Agriculture. The ministries 
working on climate change are the Ministries of Environment and Forestry, and Science 
and Technology as well as the other above-mentioned ministries. The horizontal distri-
bution of mandates makes it very difficult to make coordinated climate change policy. 
While the Ministry of Environment and Forestry coordinates the implementation of the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and the preparation of the National Communi-
cations for the UNFCCC, it has limited authority over the other issues.  
In 2007, the Government set up the Council on Climate Change with representatives 
from the Prime Ministers Office, the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, the 
ministries of External Affairs, Finance, Agriculture, Environment, Water, and Science 
and Technology and others such as the National Manufacturing Competitiveness Coun-
cil, the Economic Advisory Council and the Bureau of Energy Efficiency and several 
NGOs. This body does not include the ministries of Energy and may thus have a greater 
focus on adaptation. It released a strategy document in June 2008, which is currently be-
ing distributed but at the time of writing was not currently available on the web.  
                                                  
2  Although IEA focuses on issues of importance for the OECD countries it maintains contacts 
with the Indian government. The IAEA focuses on nuclear energy.  
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Another critical domestic factor is that India has a federal system resulting in authority 
that is divided between the national government and the provinces. This division of au-
thority implies that most agriculture, energy and water related issues are in the hands of 
the provincial governments except forestry, nuclear energy and petroleum, and inter-
state water disputes. This vertical distribution of authority makes it very difficult to make 
an integrated climate change policy that can also be implemented at the state level espe-
cially as states are allowed to have different visions on how to develop. As part of the 
global governance trend to de-centralize authority to lower authorities, India is also en-
gaging in such efforts and this will make the development of a coherent climate policy 
even more difficult.  
Although the Indian constitution obliges India to respect international law and treaty ob-
ligations,3 it does not allow for international treaties to automatically become part of na-
tional law. Active legislation within India is necessary. The Eighth Five Year Plan 
(1992-1997) did not discuss climate change but the Ninth Five Year Plan (1997-2002) 
did make some recommendations relevant to climate change. Formally India does not 
see itself as obliged to take on quantitative obligations with respect to climate change. 
However, as party to the climate treaties it is obliged to take on a number of responsibili-
ties in line with Article 4 of the Convention and Article 10 of the Protocol. India’s poli-
cies that are relevant in relation to climate change include: 
• Sustainable development is focused on conserving rivers, improving urban air quality 
and forestation; 
• The national forestry policy calls for one million hectares to be planted annually. 
• An Environment Information System has been adopted to help collect relevant in-
formation so that policies can be crafted based on this information. A GLOBE sys-
tem (Global Learning and Observations to Benefit the Environment) also supports 
this process; 
• Liberalization of the energy sector which is expected to rationalize energy produc-
tion, pricing and supply and thereby enhance the efficiency of the process; 
• The creation of the Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy in 1992 provides a major 
focus on promoting renewable energy and although it has limited funds, it over-
achieved on the targets set in the Eighth Five Year Plan; 
• The Energy Conservation Act, 2001, (in force since 2002) promotes efficient use of 
energy and its conservation through, inter alia, the creation of the Bureau of Energy 
Efficiency (BEE) to promote energy conservation and demand side management; the 
adoption of standards and labelling for energy-intensive equipment and appliances 
used in sectors such as industry, households, and agriculture; mandatory energy au-
dits through accredited auditors and a market development mechanism including pro-
ject development to be taken up in rural agricultural sub-stations with private man-
agement; municipal /metro water pumping efficiency; and energy-efficiency im-
provements in government buildings, commercial buildings, railways, defence estab-
lishments etc.; 
• National Energy Conservation Awards from the Ministry of Power provide an incen-
tive for innovative conservation measures; 
• The Electricity Act (EA 2003) provides the present legal and regulatory framework; 
                                                  
3  Article 51 of the Constitution of India. 
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• The National Agriculture Technology Project in the Ninth Five Year Plan (1997-
2002) to strengthen research, education and human resources development in the 
field of climate change and agriculture, through the national research grid; 
• The National CDM Authority (NCDMA) promotes the development of CDM  
projects; 
• The inclusion of scenarios of climate change in planning the Konkan Railway in 
western India (Shukla et al., 2004); 
• An active Judiciary has passed several judgments that have led to fuel switch in the 
public transport sector and to higher standards in the car sector. 
With respect to adaptation, The Government of India has limited policies. In 1991, a 
Coastal Zone Regulation Notification was passed calling on the provinces to prepare ap-
propriate policies. In 1992, the Conservation Strategy of the Government of India did, 
however, mention the need to develop coping mechanisms to deal with climate change.  
Although the National Communication (GoI, 2004) to the secretariat recognizes that 
climate change is likely to have different types of impacts, actual measures taken to deal 
with climate change are limited. However, there are measures to deal with climate vari-
ability. In the area of disaster management, which is a state subject, the central govern-
ment (i.e. the Ministry of Home Affairs for disaster relief and the Ministry of Agriculture 
on drought management) only intervenes when states are unable to take action. A Na-
tional Drought Early Warning System and an inter-departmental Crop Weather Watch 
Group (CWWG) are active in dealing with drought and its impacts on climate change. 
Each state often has a complementary structure to deal with climate variability. 
Other programs include the Drought Prone Areas Programme (DPAP), Desert Develop-
ment Programme (DDP), Watershed approach (A hydro-geological approach for in situ 
soil and water conservation), Food for work Programme, Employment, Assurance 
Scheme (EAS), Jawahar Gram Samridhi Yojana (JGSY, Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak 
Yojana (PMGSY), Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY), National Old Age Programme 
(NOAP), Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS), and Mid Day Meal for school 
children; however not all these programs work as well as intended (Kerr et al., 2002). 
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Since 1989, when climate change hit the political agenda, the Indian Government has 
taken the view that the bulk of greenhouse gas emissions have been emitted by the de-
veloped countries and that they are responsible for taking action first. This view is in line 
with the framing of the Climate Change Convention and its key principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities.  
Although India is now rapidly developing, it still has 70% of the population living in 
very dire circumstances and domestic social issues are critical to domestic security and 
stability. It continues to emphasize Article 4.7 that far-reaching actions must be depend-
ent on the technology and assistance provided by developed countries to the developing 
countries.  
Interviews conducted in India on a regular basis underscore that India continues to feel 
that it is being victimized by a problem essentially created by the developed world. The 
Prime Minister recently called for ‘climate justice’, a ‘fair, equitable and transparent 
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global regime for technology transfers’ based on the principle of common but differenti-







The energy sector could use modern low carbon technologies and super critical boilers. 
A number of technologies have been explored in different reports on the subject. (Gupta 
et al., 2001). 
India has received more than US$ 500 million from the GEF and about 95% of the re-
sources focus on electricity. 87 climate change related technology transfer projects un-
dertaken in India have been identified of which most are relevant in the electricity sector 
and account for about 71% of all registered technology transfer projects in India.  
At the same time, technology transfers are not always successful. Jacobson (2000; 409) 
argues that the installation of photovoltaic systems in Ladakh were successful, but that 
the state’s “focus […] on installing new systems, [and] not on building a maintenance in-
frastructure” would “likely result in future problems, as systems […] will fail prema-
turely”.  
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At present, India’s average annual reductions of GHGs via CERs is estimated at 30, 566, 
630 tonnes (UNFCCC website) and India has the largest number of registered projects. 
India is seen as an attractive host country (Point Carbon, 2005) as it has an institutional 
framework to deal with CDM and promote renewable energy and demand side manage-
ment and a wealth of local expertise to serve as project developers (Babu and 
Michaelowa, 2003; Gupta, 1997; Gupta et al., 2001; Interviews, 2005). However, the 
government process is bureaucracy laden, not always transparent, and is seen as slow, 
difficult and laborious, with high transaction costs, no guarantee of reasonable prices for 
the CERs, difficulties in proving additionality and developing baselines (Gupta et al. 
2007). The CDM potential in India however is significant, but if there are limited quanti-
tative targets in the post-2012 period, the price of CERs will fall and the market may col-
lapse. 
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In 1989, the Indian Government argued that climate change was a global problem and “it 
may be counter productive to lay down targets for countries which are still striving to 
raise the living conditions of their masses. It may be equally counter-productive to reach 
agreements to combat climate change, without devising mechanisms to ensure global 
participation” (Noordwijk Conference Report, 1990). The Government stated in its pre-
paratory documents for the 2002 World Conference on Sustainable Development, that 
India’s climate policy had three elements, first that the primary responsibility lay with 
the developed countries, second that development priorities would be seen as the driver 
for action in the developing countries and that the developed countries should help the 
developing countries through aid and technology transfer. The key justification of this 
position is that the per capita emissions have been very low.  
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Until 2004, a complete assessment of the situation of India had not been made. In 2004, 
the National Communication for the first time highlighted the key emissions of India and 
the possible impacts of climate change on India using 1994 as the base year. Until that 
period much of India’s climate strategies at the international level were based on edu-
cated guesses. With a greater degree of formalization and understanding of India’s own 
role, its policies are becoming more informed. In the domestic context, policies are being 
crafted to meet other goals such as energy security, and to some extent climate change is 
factored into the discussions if not into the decisions.  
In 1995, the Indian government prepared a paper calling for developed countries to re-
duce their emissions by 20%. Then India convinced other developing countries to join in 
this process and isolated the OPEC countries. The joint pressure of the developing coun-
tries and the European Union ultimately influenced the adoption of the Berlin Mandate 
in 1995 (Mwandosya, 1999). However, the subsequent adoption of relatively weak tar-
gets, market mechanisms that allowed for reductions of emissions outside the home 
country context and the reluctance of the US to participate in the process has further 
supported the decision of India to take a defensive stance in the international negotia-
tions. The Indian National Communication states that although it will use its fossil fuels, 
“by consciously factoring in India’s commitment to the UNFCCC, [they] have realigned 
economic development to a more climate friendly and sustainable path” (GoI, 2004). By 
the early years of this decade, the sudden rise in the rapid growth rate of India was an-
other reason that supported this defensive stance. In June 2007, Pranab Mukherjee stated 
at the G-7 meeting in Hamburg: “The mitigation regime must not reduce the prospects 
for economic growth and poverty alleviation” in developing countries. The position of 
India at Bali in December 2007 remained in line with its earlier statements. And India 
increasingly sees its participation in the CDM as its key contribution to reducing green-
house gases. However the rising fuel and d food prices in mid-2008 may have an impact 





Although India is likely to be seriously affected by the impacts of climate change as a re-
sult of the melting glaciers along the Himalayan belt in the north of India, sea-level rise 
along the east and west coast of India, changing rainfall patterns on central India, the 
recognition of how serious these impacts may be remains rhetorical. Possibly the Cli-
mate Change Council will seriously assess these impacts resulting, in the best case, in an 




India takes a strong moral position in the climate change issue. Its per capita greenhouse 
gas emissions have been relatively insignificant for the last fifteen years of the climate 
change regime and have only recently begun to increase slightly. It believes that the de-
veloped countries have failed to demonstrate leadership in actually significantly reducing 
their own emissions and the US position clearly sets a poor example.  
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Even though domestic discussions do take climate change on board at least in the energy 
sector, at international meetings the focus of the negotiators is on the need for the devel-
oped countries to address the problem in an equitable manner.  
'3! (

India sees the CDM as an opportunity for economic growth and its active participation in 
developing such projects is evidence of this. For the rest, national policy adopts modern 
sustainable development ideas to the extent that they are affordable and effective in the 
Indian context.  





This chapter focuses on Africa’s most industrialized country, South Africa. In the wake 
of apartheid, South Africa has been faced with the double challenge of continuing stable 
economic growth and eradicating poverty, while at the same time reducing the green-
house gas intensity of its economy. South Africa’s position in the post-2012 negotiations 
is likely to be determined by the question of whether addressing climate change goes 
hand-in-hand with dealing with these socio-economic challenges. 
This chapter provides an overview of the social and political factors relevant to South 
Africa’s position in the post-2012 negotiations, and provides an indication of South Af-
rica’s behaviour so far in these negotiations. The chapter first provides a country profile 
of South Africa, focusing on key socio-economic and climate change and energy indica-
tors. It then gives an overview of the country’s international commitment and the domes-
tic climate change and energy policies in place. Given this background, it goes on to ex-
amine the South African negotiation position since COP-11. On the basis of the forego-








South Africa is in a peculiar position, with a dual economy showing both characteristics 
of a developing country and of an industrialized country. The legacy of the apartheid era 
included an economy that was heavily dependant on mineral production and processing, 
as well as a set of development challenges that include “a dramatic gap between rich and 
poor, a heritage of racial oppression and inequality, a lack of infrastructure, high levels 
of unemployment and urbanization, an economy adjusting to globalization, and the new 
challenge of AIDS” (Winkler & Marquard, 2007: 1). 
After the end of apartheid in 1994, South African policies have been driven by 1) resolv-
ing the macro-economic problems resulting from apartheid; and 2) providing services 
and employment for the majority of the population (Winkler & Marquard, 2007). Al-
though the South African government hopes to diversify its economy by moving away 
from the minerals and energy dominated model of the apartheid regime, these sectors 
still account for a large part of the country’s income (Winkler & Marquard, 2007). 
South Africa still faces severe social issues. About 27% of the population of 47.9 million 
is without jobs. Furthermore, over a third of the people are living on less than US$ 2 a 
day, of which one third again are living in extreme poverty (less than US$ 1 a day). 
The most important sector of the South African economy is the services sector, although 
industry also accounts for about 20% of GDP. Although mining is still important, its 
share in GDP is slowly declining (Winkler & Marquard, 2007). South Africa’s imports 
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and exports mainly involve mineral production and processing and the energy sector 
(Winkler & Marquard, 2007). In financial terms, the European Union is of importance to 
South Africa, given that it is its largest trading partner, the main source of FDI, and the 
principal provider of official development assistance in 2005 (Murphy et al., 2008). 
Table 6.1 Overview of selected socio-economic indicators for South Africa. 
Population in 2005 47.9 mln 
GDP in 2005 239.5 bln US$ 
GDP per capita in 2005 11,110 US$ 
Human development index 2005 (and ranking) 0.674 (ranked 121, medium human develop-
ment) 
Population below: 
- 2 US$ a day (1990-2005) 




Unemployment rate in (1996-2005) 26.6% 
Sources: UNDP (2007); World Bank (2007).  
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Although classified as a developing country, South Africa has a carbon footprint that is 
comparable to some developed countries. South Africa is the world’s 12th largest CO2 
emitter (accounting for almost 1.5% of the world’s emissions). Even though total emis-
sions grew significantly between 1990 and 2004, emissions per capita, as well as the 
overall carbon intensity of the economy have only increased slightly in this period (see 
Figure 6.1). Still, emissions per capita are close to developed countries and high com-
pared to other major developing countries.  
 
Figure 6.1 Development of energy indicators 1990-2004 (Source: WRI, 2008). 
The relatively high intensity is related to the dominance of coal in the energy supply 
(72%; see Figure 6.2). The abundance of coal has lead to a low electricity price, which in 
turn has kept the share of other sources (e.g. natural gas or renewable energy) in the  
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energy mix rather small. Renewable energy consists mainly of biomass, co-fired ba-
gasse, small hydro, and to a small extent solar (Winkler, 2005). Given the energy mix, 
the energy sector is by far the largest emitting sector in the country (see Figure 6.3), fol-
lowed by manufacturing and construction, and the transport sector. Although there is lit-
tle information on non-CO2 emissions, the main emissions stem from agriculture (meth-
ane emissions from livestock), as well as industrial processes and waste (Winkler & 
Marquard, 2007). The only significant important CO2 sink is through afforestation, as 
South Africa has one of the largest man-made forestry resources in the world, covering 













































Figure 6.3 Greenhouse gas emissions in 2000 according to sector (based on WRI, 
2008). 
                                                  
4  TPES is a measure of commercial energy consumption. 
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Much of the (rural) population in South Africa is still without access to grid electricity 
(14 million, or about 30% of the population). While the South Africa government has 
been aiming to provide universal access to electricity, between 1994 and 1999 progress 
was made in achieving this goal, electrification has been proceeding slowly (Winkler & 
Marquard, 2007). There are calls to expand electrification objectives to ‘energization’, 
meaning that the government also needs to provide non-electrical energy services to 
those people still lacking them (Winkler, 2006). 
Table 6.2 Overview of selected energy and environment indicators for South Africa. 
CO2 emissions in 2004 
- total 
- % of world total 
 
- 427,9 Mt 
- 1.44% 
Greenhouse gas emissions in 2000, including 
land-use change 
443.3 Mt CO2-eq. 
CO2 per capita in 2004 9.2 
Population without electricity in 2005 14 mln 
Electrification rate (2000-2005) 70% 
Forest area in 2005 (% of total land area) 7.6% 





South Africa’s Initial National Communication (RSA, 2000) provides an assessment of 
potential climate change impacts for the country. Based on an expectation of a 1-3 de-
gree Celsius rise in temperature in the next fifty years, South Africa expects to have a 
doubling of cases of malaria with an additional 5.2 million people at risk as a result. Bil-
harzia is also expected to rise significantly. Other major impacts relate to its water re-
sources. Due to alterations in the intensity and seasonality of rainfall, there is a risk of 
enhanced desertification in an area nearly as large as half of South Africa. Water short-
age is expected to impact the cattle range by about 10% and the risk of fires is expected 
to rise. The production of maize may decrease by 10-20%. Other specialty crops in agri-
culture may also be at risk. Furthermore, forests and the forestry industry will face in-
creased difficulties due to increased aridification. Finally, climate change, in combina-
tion with population growth and increasing per capita consumption will result in major 
changes to biological diversity, with the area covered by current biomes reduced be-
tween 38% to 55% by 2050. 
Interestingly, the National Communication also highlights the impacts of response meas-
ures by Annex I countries (RSA, 2000). As South Africa is one of the world’s leading 
coal exporters, reducing the use of coal in the developed world would likely have a nega-
tive impact on South Africa’s economy (Paredis et al., 2007). The country seems to be 
struggling between the recognition that fossil fuel production could have negative local 
and global impacts, and the desire to protect its industries (DEAT, 2004). 





South Africa ratified the UNFCCC in 1997 and the Kyoto Protocol in July 2002. The 
country plays a role in two major negotiation groups, the G77 and China, and the African 
Group. The country is also involved in a number of non-UN initiatives, including the 
Major Economies Process launched by the United States, the G8+5 Gleneagles Dia-
logue, and the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (focusing on the promotion of 
CO2 capture and storage). Recently, South Africa intensified its relations with the EU, 
notably through the establishment of a strategic partnership (Murphy et al., 2008). As 
part of the implementation of the partnership, the EU and South Africa established the 
Mogôbagôba Dialogue (Council of the European Union, 2007). This dialogue will in-
clude discussions on the environment and climate change. 
The lead ministry for the international climate change negotiations is the Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT). The negotiations are conducted in partner-
ship with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). The ministry’s position is informed 
by discussions in the National Committee on Climate Change (NCCC) (DEAT, 2004; 
Goldblatt & Middleton, 2007). The NCCC is an important institution in this coordination 
of climate policy development and implementation. It is a stakeholder forum that in-
cludes representatives from various ministries, other levels of government, business, in-
dustry, and NGOs. Although the NCCC has played a useful role in bringing various 
stakeholders together, it is limited in its mandate to advise only DEAT and therefore 





South Africa is developing a range of laws and policies in the area of climate change and 
energy, the most important of which are outlined below. It has been noted that even 
though these policies have been put in place, implementation is still lagging (Winkler & 
Marquard, 2007). 
The 1998 White Paper on Energy Policy presents the South African government’s en-
ergy policy until 2010 (DME, 1998). The White Paper places South Africa’s energy pol-
icy in the context of national objectives of employment creation, and economic growth. 
More specifically, it states the following five objectives for the energy sector: 
• Increasing access to affordable energy services;  
• Improving energy governance;  
• Stimulating economic development; 
• Managing energy-related environmental and health effects; 
• Securing supply through diversity. 
The White Paper on Renewable Energy is the next main policy document (DME, 
2003b). The vision of the role of renewable energy is “[a]n energy economy in which 
modern renewable energy increases its share of energy consumed and provides afford-
able access to energy throughout South Africa, thus contributing to sustainable develop-
ment and environmental conservation” (DME, 2003b: 1). The White Paper sets a me-
dium-term target of an additional 10,000 GWh renewable energy contribution to final 
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energy consumption by 2012, mainly through biomass, wind, solar and small-scale hy-
dro (DME, 2003b). 
In 2005, the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) published its Energy Efficiency 
Strategy (DME, 2005). The Strategy sets a national target for improving energy effi-
ciency by 12% by 2015. 
The legal framework in South Africa includes a number of laws and regulations, the 
most important being the Air Quality Act 39, which covers both local and global pollut-
ants, and requires the drafting of pollution prevention plans. 
Finally, a recent development relevant for the purposes of this chapter is that in 2007, the 
ANC proposed for the first time that South Africa sets a greenhouse gas emissions re-
duction target (ANC, 2007).  
The main ministry responsible for coordinating South Africa’s response to climate 
change, including the implementation of international agreements at lower levels, is also 
DEAT. According to South Africa’s Climate Change Response Strategy, DEAT needs to 
coordinate with other government departments, including DME and DFA, to ensure that 
climate change policies are compatible with other priorities (DEAT, 2004).  
In addition to the various ministries and government bodies, the Designated National 
Authority (DNA), which plays a key role in approving Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) projects, has been active since 2004. 
1' 
/)$ #
Although South Africa acknowledges the urgency of the climate change problem, it is 
faced with the challenge of addressing its own development priorities first. Hence, the 
only way of framing climate change in an acceptable manner is by emphasizing the local 
sustainable development co-benefits of climate change policies. The country’s Climate 
Change Response Strategy illustrates this point. The document emphasizes that devel-
opment comes first and that responses to climate change need to be “within the context 
of the present economic realities of the country and the inequitable distribution of global 
wealth” (DEAT, 2004: iii). The report further highlights that some officials might see 
climate policy as going “against national development priorities” (DEAT, 2004: 10). 
However, the report lists a number of opportunities to exploit synergies between devel-
opment goals and sustainable development. 
Halsnæs et al. (2008) indicate that South Africa’s participation in international climate 
policy could result in significant costs with negative impacts on development priorities, 
such as energy affordability, if there is no form of compensation. Hence, side-payments, 
in the form of enhanced technology transfer and the provision of financial resources 
from developed countries, are seen as a necessary component of international climate 
change action (DEAT, 2004). 







Given the challenges faced by the country, new policies and technologies will be needed. 
Although “a limited set of mitigation options has been relatively well explored” 
(Winkler & Marquard, 2007: 17), there are still multiple options for South Africa to limit 
its greenhouse gas emissions. Winkler (2006; 2007), summarizing the results of a large 
research project, discusses a set of possible energy policies that could be adopted, includ-
ing policies aimed at: 
• Higher energy efficiency in industry, commercial buildings and the residential sector; 
• Increasing the biodiesel production; 
• Increasing the share of renewable electricity, including the capacity of nuclear energy 
production and increasing imported hydropower; 
• Increasing natural gas imports; and 
• Introducing a tax on electricity generated by coal. 
The research project concludes that energy efficiency measures, especially in the power 
and industrial sectors, hold the most potential when assessed in the light of sustainable 
development indicators (Winkler, 2006; 2007). Notwithstanding the potential of energy 
efficiency measures, there is further potential on the energy supply side through a diver-
sification of the energy mix (including renewable energy and natural gas), and through 
the deployment of clean coal technologies.  
Although the theoretical potential of renewables in South Africa is enormous, they have 
only played a small role so far in meeting the objective of increasing access to electric-
ity, mainly through increasing off-grid electrification (Winkler, 2005). To increase the 
share of renewables in the energy mix, new policies are needed. One option is to increase 
the import of hydropower from other African countries, notably the Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo (DRC) (Winkler et al., 2007; Halsnæs et al., 2008). South Africa could use 
its existing ties through the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to ex-
ploit this potential. Halsnæs et al. (2008: 214) conclude that the hydropower potential for 
South Africa is “fairly robust” although its implementation in the region “will have to 
overcome many political barriers”. One of these barriers is that South Africa would be-
come increasingly dependent on energy imports (Winkler, 2007). Another option that is 
being considered is nuclear energy, which is currently undergoing a “renaissance” 
(Winkler & Marquard, 2007: 14). The state-owned utility Eskom is developing a so-
called Pebble-Bed Modular Reactor, and has further plans to enhance nuclear capacity. 
Furthermore, although the technology does not feature in any policy documents or 
strategies, there appears to be interest in increasing the use of hydrogen technologies in 
South Africa (e.g. DEAT, 2005). 
Another option is to enhance the share of natural gas by increasing imports. Small 
amounts are already imported from Namibia and Mozambique. However, as in the case 
of hydropower, this option would make South Africa’s energy supply more dependent on 
imports (Winkler, 2007).  
Other technologies focus on cleaning the energy supply by reducing emissions from 
coal. Clean coal technologies for power production, such as pulverized fuel combustion, 
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integrated gasification and combustion, and coal-powered fuel cells are not yet available, 
but could become so in the medium to long term (Winkler, 2006). Another technology 
that holds significant potential is carbon capture and storage (CCS). Mwakasonda and 
Winkler (2006) examined the promises and pitfalls of the technology for South Africa. 
The heavy reliance on coal will very likely continue in the foreseeable future (DME, 
2003a), and could thus make CCS a realistic option for the country. They argue, how-
ever, that the technology brings few or even negative sustainable development benefits. 
In particular, introducing the technology would raise electricity prices, thereby endanger-
ing the affordability of energy services. On the other hand, CCS would involve technol-
ogy transfer to South Africa. 
Although there is thus a wide range of options to address the high CO2 emissions in 
South Africa, Winkler and Marquard (2007) indicate that even if these options were fully 
exploited, CO2 emissions would still be 30% higher than the 2000 level. Instead, they 
suggest that putting South Africa on a path towards a low-carbon society, more far 
reaching measures are needed including: 1) incentive programs for energy-intensive in-
dustries; 2) pricing energy to reflect external costs for non-energy-intensive sectors of 
the economy; 3) investment in climate-friendly technologies where the country has a re-
source (e.g. solar thermal technology); 4) measures to lower the energy intensity of key 
industries; and 5) economy-wide measures such as carbon taxes or emissions trading 
systems (Winkler & Marquard, 2007). 
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Given South Africa’s large dependence on coal and consequent high emission levels, 
there is considerable potential for emissions savings through the CDM. Furthermore, the 
investment climate is generally considered to be good, and the capacity for CDM im-
plementation is in place (Jung, 2006). However, complicated approval procedures reduce 
South Africa’s attractiveness. Furthermore, the low electricity price in the country forms 
a barrier for renewable energy and energy efficiency projects (BFAI, 2006). 
Initially, South African stakeholders were sceptical of the use of the CDM, especially if 
the mechanism would not bring about sustainable development benefits (Kim, 2003). 
Nevertheless, CDM investors are increasingly finding their way to South Africa. On 1 
May 2008, 13 projects had been registered with the CDM Executive Board, while 10 
more projects were awaiting validation. However, this still represents only 0.7% of all 
projects in the CDM pipeline (Fenhann, 2007).  
South Africa’s strategic objectives for the CDM include: 1) serving as a lever for FDI-
related employment creation in sectors that can achieve emissions reductions; 2) promot-
ing policy initiatives aimed at emissions reductions; and 3) enabling technology transfer 
(Rosenberg, 2007). The increased use of sectoral CDM in the country could potentially 
facilitate greater investments in energy efficiency projects in the residential, transport, 
commercial, and industrial sectors (Rosenberg, 2007). 
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In addition to the CDM, international cooperation could provide opportunities for South 
African climate policy in three respects (Winkler & Marquard, 2007): 
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1. Finance: Mainstreaming climate change into ODA, and the establishment of a Multi-
lateral Technology Acquisition Fund could provide the necessary funding for low-
carbon technologies. These funds could in turn leverage private investment as well; 
2. Technology transfer: Through setting up a multilateral technology transfer facility, 
sensitive issues such as intellectual property rights, multilateral funding for technol-
ogy development in developing countries, and international technology standards 
could be addressed. Such a facility could also build capacity for state and non-state 
actors involved working with low-carbon technologies, and could develop demon-
stration projects; 
3. Capacity building: International cooperation could support the building of capacity 
with regard to climate policy-making, including training of experts in- and outside of 
government. For example, capacity building could provide support in preparing  
future National Communications (RSA, 2000). 
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Overall, South Africa’s position in the climate negotiations is in line with that of the G77 
and China. In the discussions and formal negotiations on a future framework, South Af-
rica has indicated its preferences to some extent on issues of mitigation, adaptation, de-
forestation, the Clean Development Mechanism, and technology development. These po-
sitions are outlined below. 
Regarding climate change mitigation, South Africa has been explicit in terms of both 
what can be expected from developing countries and with respect to the commitments 
that developed countries need to take on. Whereas the former is to be discussed under 
the Convention negotiation ‘track’, the latter needs to be addressed under the Protocol 
‘track’. South Africa posits that the outcomes of the Bali Action Plan represent a major 
step forwards for developing countries, going beyond what they had pledged to do be-
fore, although emphasizing that developing country mitigation actions need to be sup-
ported by technology and enabled by finance (UNFCCC, 2008). More importantly, how-
ever, the South African delegation has made it clear that “climate policy on its own will 
not solve the climate problem” (UNFCCC, 2006c: 2), and that the best approach to 
tackle the problem is by making development more sustainable and providing for posi-
tive incentives for developing countries. 
In this context, South Africa has formally made a proposal to consider the inclusion of 
sustainable development policies and measures (SD-PAMs) in a future framework 
(UNFCCC, 2006b; 2006c). The concept of SD-PAMs, which emanates from the idea 
that climate change policies need to be integrated with sustainable development policies, 
has received significant attention in the climate policy literature in recent years (Winkler 
et al., 2002; 2007a; 2008; Baumert & Winkler, 2005). The concept emphasizes the sus-
tainable development co-benefits of greenhouse gas emission reduction policies. South 
Africa’s main rationale for putting forward the proposal in the UNFCCC talks is to ob-
tain recognition of action taken by developing countries (UNFCCC, 2006c). The SD-
PAMs approach is related to the existing UNFCCC commitments of developing coun-
tries to formulate and implement measures to mitigate climate change (Article 4.1(b) 
UNFCCC). Under the approach, developing countries would pledge to effectively im-
plement sustainable development policies. South Africa acknowledges, however, that the 
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SD-PAMs approach is in itself not sufficient to address the climate change problem 
(UNFCCC, 2006c).  
While South Africa is thus actively tabling proposals on how developing countries could 
be integrated in a future climate regime, it has been adamant in its opposition of increas-
ing flexibility with respect to developed country commitments. Generally, the country 
would like to see emissions reductions between 25% and 40% in 2020 compared to 1990 
levels (IISD, 2007). The country has emphasized that “principles of equity, responsibil-
ity and capability” should guide the setting of commitments for developed countries 
(UNFCCC, 2007b). The importance of historical responsibility for greenhouse gas con-
centrations in the atmosphere also featured in other contributions to the process (e.g. 
IISD, 2006c). 
Regarding adaptation, South Africa has indicated that even though it faces various cli-
mate change impacts, there is as of yet insufficient capacity to deal with these impacts 
(UNFCCC, 2007b). The country supports the generation of additional financial re-
sources, including insurance, the Global Environment Facility, and innovative adaptation 
funding mechanisms (UNFCCC, 2007c; see also UNFCCC, 2006b), and the streamlin-
ing of these various funding sources (IISD, 2008). 
As for the CDM, South Africa—like other African countries—has questioned the inequi-
table geographic distribution of CDM projects (IISD, 2006a). It has suggested exploring 
the opportunity to expand the CDM to programs and policies (UNFCCC, 2006b). Fur-
thermore, it has expressed interest in searching for ways to include CCS into the mecha-
nism (IISD, 2006c). 
Finally, with regard to technology development, South Africa has urged the international 
community to adopt positive incentives that address questions of intellectual property 
rights and other barriers to the access to commercial clean technologies, including possi-





Challenges abound in South African climate policy. The energy sector is faced with the 
Herculean task of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions, while at the same time improv-
ing affordable energy access to the poor and ensuring international competitiveness. In 
other words, development needs to be made sustainable. The difficulty is that South Af-
rica’s economy, as it developed in the apartheid era, has been locked into a high level of 
dependency on fossil fuels, notably coal. Although options exist to address the high 
emissions from this energy source, these options will need to be consistent with objec-
tives that are considered more important, such as economic growth, poverty alleviation, 
employment creation, and income inequality. 
However, the South African government is aware that it cannot sit back and wait for 
other countries take action. Initial assessments of climate change impacts on the country 
indicate the potential severe effects on human health, water resources, food security, 
biodiversity, and subsequently on various sectors of the economy. Although a start has 
been made, the country does not have adequate capacity to adapt to these impacts. 




South Africa sees itself as a developing country and is classified as such. This does not 
imply that the country is taking a defensive stance at the negotiations. Indeed, South Af-
rica has been a strong supporter of the Kyoto Protocol’s cap-and-trade approach, and has 
expressed its willingness to participate through non-legally binding commitments. This 
is most apparent in its explicit support of the SD-PAMs approach. South Africa shows 
that it is willing to take further action on the basis of differentiated responsibility. How-
ever, the flipside is that South Africa expects the richer nations to take on more ambi-
tious targets, and provide additional technological and financial resources. 
The conduct of international negotiations needs not only to be in line with the country‘s 
domestic development priorities, but should also conform to the priorities of South Afri-
can foreign policy, which include a focus on Africa, South-South cooperation (especially 
with Brazil and India, but also with the G77 and China), and a commitment to rule-based 
multilateralism (Winkler & Marquard, 2007). South Africa’s position will thus be influ-
enced first by national priorities, then by regional concerns in Africa, then the priorities 
of the G77 and China, and finally global concerns (DEAT, 2004).  
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The following statement perhaps best captures how South Africa perceives the opportu-
nities of addressing climate change: 
“South Africa needs to vigorously pursue the opportunities latent in the requirements 
that developed countries assist developing countries in their climate change response 
actions. This should be used as a vehicle to maximize the development benefits for 
South Africa, and the Southern African region as a whole, and to put in place suitable 
adaptation measures, ensuring a minimum of disruption while maximizing the return 
on any internal resources that are used” (DEAT, 2004: 4). 
The number of opportunities perhaps equals the number of challenges for the country. 
The potential for energy efficiency in various sectors has barely been tapped, and the 
high emissions from coal provide several options for reducing South Africa’s carbon 
footprint, including energy diversification and clean coal technologies.  
Of course, a lot depends on the level of international cooperation, and how South Africa 
will manage to benefit from this. A number of options are available. The number of 
CDM projects, although slightly increasing, could still be significantly expanded, espe-
cially if some form of sectoral CDM is agreed upon as part of a post-2012 agreement. 
Furthermore, South Africa could benefit from mainstreaming efforts in the development 
aid policies of developed countries, establishing multilateral mechanisms for technology 
transfer, and enhanced capacity building. 




As the largest and most populous country in Latin America, Brazil is an important politi-
cal and economic power in the wider region, a leader among developing countries, and 
an emerging world power. Brazil was a Portuguese colony from 1500 until its independ-
ence in 1822. Not least since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva became president of Brazil in 
2002, the country’s foreign policy has strongly tended towards multilateralism, forging 
closer ties with other countries in the region, and engaging actively into diplomacy 
within the United Nations and the Organization of American States.  
This chapter first sketches out key elements in Brazil’s socio-economic and energy pro-
file that shape its position in the post-2012 climate debate. Next, the effects climate 
change may have on the country are detailed followed by the country’s international 
commitments with regard to climate change are summarized. We then present an over-
view of Brazil’s evolving domestic climate policy. Finally, Brazil’s strategy and views in 
the UNFCCC negotiations since 2005 are discussed, with a view to identifying possible 
leverage points in the coming negotiations, based on the country’s perception on equity, 






Brazil is among the ten largest economies in the world, and also a large agricultural pro-
ducer. It has a diverse middle-income economy, with mature mining and manufacturing 
industries, including cement, aluminium, chemical products, oil and petro-chemical feed 
stocks. After a series of economic reforms in the 1990s, the country is today a net ex-
porter.  
The most important sector in Brazil is the services industry, accounting for 55% of GDP, 
followed by 37% from industry and only 8% from agriculture (Brazil, 2004). Despite a 
growth of per capita GDP by 13% during the 1990s, parts of the population, over 80% of 
which live in cities, are still poverty-stricken (almost 30% of the population survives at 
less than US$ 2 per day), and regional disparities are considerable. Therefore, economic 
development, improving health care, and narrowing of the growing social gap in Brazil 
remain key priorities for each government, implying that environmental and climate 
policies will always be judged in terms of their social co-benefits.  
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Table 7.1 Overview of selected socio-economic indicators for Brazil. 
Population 186.8 
Population growth rate 1975-2005 &2005-
2015 
1.8; 1.2 
GDP 2005 796.1 
GDP per capita 2005 8,402 (PPP) 
GDP growth rate  
Human development index 2005 (# and rank-
ing) 
0.800, rank 70 
Human poverty index 9.7%, rank 23 
Population below 2 USD and 1 USD a day 
1990-2005 (%) 
Below 1 USD: 7.5%; Below 2 USD: 21.2% 
People without electricity Electrification rate 97%; 6.5 million without 
electricity 
Imports of goods and services (2005) % of 
GDP 
12% 
Exports of goods and services (2005) % of 
GDP 
17% 
ODA received in mln USD 2005 191.9 
Net FDI inflows % of GDP 2005 0.2 
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Table 7.2 Overview of selected energy and environment indicators for Brazil.  
Electricity consumption per capita 2004 kWh 
 
2,340 
Population without electricity 2005 
 
Electrification rate 97%; 6.5 million without 
electricity (duplication with above) 
Forest area % of total land area 2005  
 
57.2% 
Forest area average annual change 1990-2005 
 
- 0.5% 
Total primary energy supply (TPES) 2005 
 
209.5 
CO2 emissions 2004  346.2 (excluding LULUCF)  
CO2 per capita 1.9 
% of world total 1.16% 
Given its size, it is not surprising that Brazil was ranked as the 19th largest greenhouse 
gas emitter in 2004 (and moves forward to rank 5 when emissions from land-use change 
and forestry are included). The latter shows the peculiarity of Brazil’s emissions profile 
– low emissions per capita and per unit of GDP thanks to a relatively clean energy ma-
trix, but massive emissions resulting from land-use change and forestry making up close 
to 60% of the national greenhouse gas emissions. Last but not least, emissions from agri-
culture, more specifically enteric fermentation due to cattle farming, are also consider-
able.  
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Figure 7.1 Development of Emission trends for Brazil 1990-2004 (Source: WRI, 2008). 
Energy-related emissions in Brazil are relatively low due to large-scale use of renewable 
resources, particularly hydro and biomass. Over 90% of the country’s electricity is based 
on hydropower, and renewable energy contributes roughly 15% to the overall energy 
mix (Brazil, 2004, see Figure 7.2). However, Brazil’s energy base will get dirtier over 
the years to come as energy demand is growing fast (and more quickly than primary en-
ergy production and the national economy) (Chandler et al., 2007). This gap will in the 
near future likely be covered through an increasing reliance on natural gas, with a result-























Figure 7.2 Brazil’s Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES) in 2004 (based on IEA, 2007). 
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As mentioned above, Brazil’s primary source of emissions is deforestation, in particular 
from the Amazon area, a key carbon sink for the global climate system. As Brazil’s Na-
tional Communication to the UNFCCC states, 96% of its emissions from land-use 
change and forestry can be “attributed to forest conversion” (Brazil, 2004)—plainly 
speaking, deforestation to gain land for cattle ranching and for soybean cultivation. In to-
tal, more than 690,000 square kilometres of rain forest have been lost this way, leading 



















On the basis of the latest IPCC report on impacts and vulnerability to climate change and 
a series of studies conducted by the INPE institute, the country can expect major nega-
tive, and little to no positive impacts from climate change on its territory (Magrin et al., 
2007; Marengo et al., 2007). The most affected regions will be the semi-arid north-east 
of the country as well as the Amazon. As the IPCC report states, “replacement of tropical 
forest by savannas is expected in eastern Amazonia [. .], along with replacement of semi-
arid vegetation by arid vegetation in parts of north-east Brazil [...]” (Magrin et al., 2007). 
The resulting higher temperatures in the Amazon as well as shifts in evaporation system 
will no doubt put considerable stress on its complex ecosystems. The social conse-
quences are likely to be worst in the north-east, which displays some of the highest pov-
erty levels in all of Brazil. From a health perspective, a hotter and more humid climate 
will also lead to increasing numbers and geographic spreading of vector borne diseases, 
such as malaria, yellow fever, dengue fever and encephalitis (Marengo et al., 2007).  
From an economic point of view, none of Brazil’s key crops are expected to benefit from 
a changed climate. Soy in particular is likely to suffer from heat spells and dry periods 
(Marengo et al., 2007). Reductions in river flows may also impact Brazil’s hydropower 
production, which generates over three quarters of the country’s electricity (Magrin et 
al., 2007). Finally, sea-level rise due to climate change implies major risks for Brazil’s 
coastal infrastructures and cities, where about a quarter of its population lives (ibid).  
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Overall, despite the recent large-scale national effort to better assess Brazil’s vulnerabili-
ties to climate change, researchers have major uncertainties, mainly due to a lack of reli-
able long-term projections of the country’s possible future climates at a sufficiently high 
spatial resolution (Brazil, 2004). Workable climate systems data still seem to be lacking 
for large sections of the country, including Amazonia (Marengo et al., 2007). As this is 
not a problem specific to Brazil, but applicable to large parts of the developing world, 
committing major funds and large-scale international research collaboration to better as-
sess regional impacts of climate change in the South may be a valuable bargaining chip 
in the post-2012 negotiations.  
Moving from impacts and vulnerabilities to the perception of the climate problem in 
Brazil, and environmental awareness more broadly, the degree of social mobilization, 
also on environmental issues, is generally high in Brazil. Already at the time of the Rio 
Earth Summit, a survey counted as many as 1,533 environmental NGOs in the country 
(Ecolista, 1996).  
On the climate front, public opinion and media coverage overwhelmingly support action 
against climate change, as evidenced by a recent poll of the BBC World Service of 
22,000 persons in 21 countries. 78% of respondents in Brazil said that they had heard of 
or read about climate change, and 76% were convinced that the issue requires “major 
steps starting very soon” (BBC World Service, 2007). Interestingly, 63% even supported 
emission caps for less wealthy countries – a more progressive stance than the Brazilian 
government! However, as Born et al. (2005) point out, while interest in the subject is 
significant in Brazil, its position in the post-2012 negotiations, e.g. what kind of targets 
the country could or should accept, is hardly discussed in detail publicly (ibid.). 
Concern about climate change in Brazil is closely linked to the worries of many Brazil-
ians about the Amazon, an issue close to the nation’s heart. Given the largely urbanized 
population, most support decisive action and better law enforcement against deforesta-
tion; the key challenge lies therefore essentially in overcoming the opposition of influen-





As the host of the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, Brazil was among the first countries to 
sign the UNFCCC, ratifying it two years later in 1994. Brazil also ratified the Kyoto Pro-
tocol unusually quickly, compared to the traditional pace for international ratifications 
(Viola, 2008), to ensure its entry into force in 2002 (eventually delayed until Russia’s 
ratification in 2005).  
Brazil is also involved in other international climate initiatives outside the UNFCCC, in-
cluding the G8+5 group, the Major Economies Meeting and the Methane for Markets 
partnership. With the booming interest in biofuels, Brazil is also increasingly committing 
to international partnerships and cooperation in this field, including the International 
Biofuels Forum, the US-Brazil Ethanol Partnership, and a regular Energy Policy Dia-
logue between the EU and Brazil. 
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Despite its involvement in such a multitude of climate-related fora, Brazil has continu-
ously emphasized the primacy of the UNFCCC as the key multilateral platform to ad-
dress climate change, as evidenced by President Lula da Silva’s statement when Presi-
dent Bush’s plans for the Major Economies Initiative first emerged: “The Brazilian posi-
tion is clear cut. I cannot accept the idea that we have to build another group to discuss 
the same issues that we addressed in Kyoto and not fulfilled” (The Guardian, 2007).  
The Ministry for External Relations (MRE) leads the Brazilian delegation in interna-
tional negotiations on climate change, working together with the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MCT) and the Ministry of the Environment (MMA). Viola (2008) regrets 
that this ‘diplomatic mindset’ in the driving seat often leads to less ambitious or innova-
tive negotiation positions than would be possible under the lead of the MMA.  
It is also worth nothing that the Brazilian NGO forum has a designated representative 
that attends the UNFCCC meetings as a member of the Brazilian delegation and is also 





Responsibility for domestic climate policy in Brazil is shared between the MCT and the 
MMA, with lead responsibility in many cases attributed to the former. In 2000, a “Bra-
zilian Forum on Climate Change” was established. The committee is presided over by 
President Lula and encompasses 12 ministers as well as representatives of scientific and 
non-governmental organizations. It was supposed to be a key tool to support the main-
streaming of climate issues in all policy fields, yet so far seems to have done little else 
than public meetings at universities (Born et al., 2005).  
At the sub-national level, local governments of the cities of Rio de Janeiro, Curitiba and 
others are active in the international network Cities for Climate Protection. Other states 
are actively pursuing regional initiatives in the fields of both mitigation and adaptation. 
Brazil’s domestic efforts with regard to climate change show a “dual face” (Paredis et 
al., 2006): while the country is an environmental leader among developing countries 
with regard to emission reductions in the energy sector, its record in the crucial challenge 
of reducing deforestation in the Amazon is, despite some recent progress, still bleak. The 
measures in the energy sector were mostly adopted not on climate grounds, but for other 
reasons, such as concerns over energy security, employment generation or reduction of 
local air pollution. However, they “cut investment requirements in the energy sector, re-
duced net energy imports and improved the balance of trade, enhanced energy effi-
ciency, expanded renewable energy use, and ushered in several positive social and envi-
ronmental changes.”(Chandler et al., 2002)  
Brazil’s flagship policy in the climate field is its automotive ethanol program PRO-
ALCOOL, launched in the 1970s in response to the oil price shocks and the tumbling in-
ternational sugar prices. The program is the world’s largest commercial application of 
biomass for energy production. A by-product of the sugarcane used to produce ethanol, 
bagasse, is being widely used for renewable cogeneration of electricity. Both biomass 
fuels are estimated to have reduced Brazil’s CO2 emissions by 7% in the year 2000 
(ibid).  
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Policies to curb emissions on the demand-side through energy conservation and effi-
ciency in the transport and electricity sector have also been successful. The PROCEL 
program, for example, running since 1985 has aimed at reducing the waste of electricity 
of both supply and demand, has resulted in emission reductions (La Rovere, 2002).  
One of the most recent actions by the government is the 2004 Biodiesel initiative (PRO-
BIODIESEL), which is linked to social inclusion and regional development programs. 
The program requires all diesel sold in Brazil to contain at least 2% biodiesel by 2008, 
and 5% from 2013.  
Brazil’s policies in the land-use sector have long been stymied by weak law enforce-
ment, unsecured land tenure, and counter-productive incentives such as subsidized cred-
its for soybean cultivation and cattle ranching (Volpi, 2007). A 2004 Action Plan for 
Preventing and Controlling Deforestation, integrating the work of 15 separate ministries, 
was supposed to give much needed impetus here. Sub-level initiatives have equally 
flourished, with the states Amazonas and Mato Grosso introducing models for compen-
sation for “environmental services” and increasing parts of the Amazon being put under 
protection. The efforts initially seemed to bear fruit; the state of Mato Grosso reported a 
reduction in the deforestation rate by nearly 40% in the first two years since the national 
plan came into existence (INPE, 2007). While other factors have certainly contributed to 
this trend, experts also emphasize the impact of increased government control and better 
enforcement of policies (Moutinho, 2007). Yet with the recent soaring of food prices 
around the globe, this trend seems to have reversed dramatically (BBC, 2008) and the 
struggle to address this key problem on Brazil’s, and in fact the world’s mitigation 
agenda appears far from resolved. The role of forests and deforestation in the future cli-




Brazilian policy-makers are well aware of the seriousness of climate change. President 
Lula referred to global warming as the single most important issue on the global agenda, 
even before international trade (The Guardian, 2007). Brazil sides with the rest of the 
developing countries in attributing responsibility for climate change to the industrialized 
countries thus deriving a “you mitigate and we follow” logic. The country's domestic 
emissions profile, at least on the energy side, provides ample justification for this posi-
tion. Thanks to the measures taken to boost renewables, particularly hydropower, and 
biofuels since the 1970s, Brazil still has very low per capita emissions and low carbon 
intensity, despite rising overall emissions trends. With considerable parts of the popula-
tion still living in poverty, poverty eradication and economic development remain an 
overriding political imperative in the country, which at time eclipses more distant long-
term threats such as climate change in day-to-day policy-making.  
Finally, regarding the Amazon, with regard to which at least the urbanized parts of the 
Brazilian population may acknowledge their country's role not only as a victim of cli-
mate change, but as a 'carbon perpetrator', the Brazilian government becomes very tight-
lipped. In a one page special contribution to the most recent Human Development Report 
on Brazil's role in climate change, President Lula refers to the Amazon only in a last, 
short paragraph:  
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“Finally, a brief comment on rainforests. The Amazon region is a treasured national 
resource. We recognize that this resource has to be managed sustainably. That is why 
we introduced in 2004 an Action Plan for Preventing and Controlling Deforestation 
in the Amazon. [...] The decline since 2004 in the rate of deforestation recorded in 
states such as Mato Grosso demonstrates that it is possible to reconcile economic 
growth with sustainable environmental management.” (UNDP, 2007)  
This attitude, the deep suspicions of outside involvement in the management of the 
Amazon, is symptomatic also for Brazil's longstanding position regarding the treatment 




Climate change, despite the adverse consequences projected for Brazil as discussed 





With concerns over energy security becoming ever more salient around the globe, Bra-
zil's long-standing frontrunner position in the production and use of biofuels makes it a 
much sought-after cooperation partner. This concerns not only the potential for the ex-
change of scientific, technological and policy know-how, but also, even more impor-
tantly, the major export opportunities arising from it. Exports of ethanol currently 
amounting to over three billion litres per year could see a threefold increase over the next 
decade (Allianz, 2007).  
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Next to biofuels, CDM, whose last-minute inclusion in the Kyoto Protocol goes back to 
a proposal by the Brazilian delegation, has great potential in Brazil. The country was a 
relatively early mover in the carbon market and has since consolidated its leading posi-
tion, together with China and India. By the end of April, 131 CDM projects in Brazil had 
been registered by the Executive Board, making up a share of more than 10% in the 
global CDM market. Brazilian policy-makers are very enthusiastic about the CDM, “a 
cooperation instrument that is both brilliant and innovative” according to Brazil’s state-
ment in the Seminar for Governmental Experts in Bonn in 2005 (UNFCCC, 2005). They 
see the mechanism’s potential in both technology transfer and “even, more important, in 
supporting the development of local technologies” (ibid).  
With its general attractiveness for FDI flows, not least because of its stable institutional 
context and investment climate, Brazil looks set to benefit equally from any future mar-
ket mechanism. Outside of the forest sector, project types related to energy efficiency 
and fuel substitution in the energy sector, or those aiming at process change, energy effi-
ciency and fuel substitution in industries such as aluminium, cement, chemical, ferroal-
loys, iron and steel, pulp and paper are seen as particularly promising (UNIDO, 2003).  
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Even if this may not yet have been completely recognized by Brazilian climate negotia-
tors, potentially the greatest ‘opportunity’ for Brazil is the Amazon and the need to pre-
serve it as one of the world’s most important carbon sinks (Allianz, 2007). No matter 
what shape a REDD mechanism in a post-2012 climate agreement eventually takes, Bra-
zil would most likely be one of the main beneficiaries and such an instrument could trig-
ger financial transfers of a totally different scale than exports of biofuels or CDM in-
vestments. Currently, key authorities in the Brazilian climate debate are still very scepti-
cal about how a REDD mechanism could be designed and implemented in a credible 
manner that maintains its environmental integrity (Neeff, 2008). Yet provided the Brazil-
ian authorities come around to the idea and secure credible commitments by key stake-
holders for far-reaching steps to halt deforestation, a REDD mechanism could be key to 
providing the capital needed for changing the incentive structure in such a way that for-




Finally, thinking about possible ‘grand bargains’ outside the climate realm to convince 
Brazil to join a post-2012 agreement, two issues come to mind. The first is the Doha 
round, where President Lula has positioned himself as one of the key voices of develop-
ing countries. Progress in this round of trade negotiations, which started in 2001, has 
stalled over a range of issues, including agriculture, intellectual property rights, and ac-
cess to developing country markets. Further issue linkages between the already complex 
climate and trade realms may not facilitate things in either forum. Yet well-targeted and 
timely concessions by the EU (and the US), for example on cutbacks of agricultural sub-
sidies, could be potential levers to secure Brazil’s commitment to ambitious post-2012 
action.  
Secondly, a seat in the UN Security Council has long been one of the Brazil’s key aspira-
tions in its foreign policy. Even though UN reform currently seems a distant prospect af-
ter the failure of the 60th Anniversary UN General Assembly in 2005, this could change 
in the future – and progress on the issue of Security Council membership would un-
doubtedly be a powerful argument to force progress also in the UNFCCC arena. 
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Brazil has been actively involved in the UNFCCC negotiations since the 1990s. Its sub-
mission in 1997, later labelled the “Brazilian proposal”, which sought to attribute mitiga-
tion burdens based on a country’s accumulated emissions since the industrial revolution, 
has been on the COP agenda for years. Yet, while garnering the support of most develop-
ing countries, it has failed to convince industrialized countries (Viola, 2008).  
With regard to the post-2012 debate and the questions surrounding mitigation commit-
ments for developing countries, Brazil’s position has evolved over the last few years. At 
the Bonn Seminar for Governmental Experts in spring 2005, Brazil’s position was still 
unambiguous: "Efforts undertaken by developing countries to reduce emissions in differ-
ent sectors within their territories can only be characterized as voluntary and, therefore, 
cannot be linked or associated with goals, targets or timeframes," (UNFCCC, 2005a).  
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Since then, it has moved away from this very principled stance. While the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities is still at the core of its negotiating position, a 
Brazilian delegate signalled room for compromise at an informal debate in 2007: “I 
would like however, to underline that this principle [the principle of common but differ-
entiated responsibilities] does not exempt any party of its responsibilities. In this sense, 
the effort to combat climate change must be a global one” (Machado, 2007). Paula Ca-
pobianco, executive secretary at the Brazilian Environment Ministry, went even further, 
saying that “Brazil would not be unwilling to accept targets, if the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibility were respected—that is, if countries historically respon-
sible for emissions stepped up their contribution to mitigating global warming” (quoted 
in IPS, 2007). This change in position is, according to Viola (2008), the result of “both 
domestic and international dynamics”, as the country´s categorical refusal to accept tar-
gets had drawn heavy criticism from a range of societal actors in 2007 (Viola, 2008). 
Emphasizing that “discussions disconnected from effective negotiations cannot prosper”, 
Brazil was also supportive to transforming the “Long-term Dialogue on Cooperative Ac-
tion” under the UNFCCC into a formal negotiation setting—one of the successes of the 
Bali summit (IISD, 2007a). 
At the Bangkok climate talks in early 2008, Brazil further elaborated on its position with 
regard to differentiated post-2012 commitments for developing and developed countries. 
While the latter should be obliged to cut back emissions under a future climate regime, it 
should be the task of the former to limit their emissions growth (IISD, 2008). Further-
more, and importantly, Brazil (along with China and others) demands that monitoring, 
reporting and verification of the mitigation actions that developing countries may be 
committing to should occur nationally (implying that these countries would report poli-
cies adopted and emission trends without being exposed to further scrutiny at the interna-
tional level) (ibid). Finally, any commitments by developing countries should be linked 
to “international incentives [...] and the recognition of existing actions” (ibid). 
Another topic, on which Brazil regularly speaks up during the international climate ne-
gotiations, is, not surprisingly, the role of forests in the climate regime. The country has 
long adopted a very defensive line on this issue, which led it to reject the inclusion of the 
whole carbon cycle into the Kyoto Protocol (Viola, 2008). The government feared that 
such a provision could provide the basis for a country being held accountable for its high 
deforestation rates under a future climate regime that includes commitments for emerg-
ing economies (ibid). These concerns over a possible loss of sovereignty over the Ama-
zon have also prompted the Brazilian delegation to oppose the development of market-
based instruments under the UNFCCC to compensate for “avoided deforestation”.  
Given this history, the written submission by Brazil at the Montreal COP in 2005 can be 
considered a major shift in position. According to Viola (2008), the initiative was pre-
ceded by major internal debate between the Brazilian Environment Ministry which sup-
ported the proposal and the Ministry for External Relations, which is leading the Brazil-
ian delegation at the climate negotiations and which was more reluctant to tackle this is-
sue head-on (Viola, 2008). The proposal called for the creation of an international fund 
fed from voluntary contributions by industrialized countries that would reward efforts to 
reduce deforestation rates in developing countries based on average historical baselines 
(UNFCCC, 2006a). Brazilian delegates have since reiterated the proposal and expanded 
upon its details at subsequent international meetings.  
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However, the Brazilian position on this issue remains vague. At the Bali summit, Brazil 
rejected the consideration of conservation and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in 
the context of REDD negotiations (IISD, 2007b), casting doubt over its overall strategy 
on this issue. This might be due to an internal split within the Brazilian delegation, 
which prevents the country from adopting a clear position, also against the background 
of powerful domestic lobbies that are economically benefiting from deforestation.  
Moving on to Brazil’s standpoint on CDM in the context of a post-2012 regime, its atti-
tude is characterized by an emphasis on the environmental integrity of the mechanism 
and reluctance to risk damaging the functioning of the market through experimentation. 
Brazil opposes the inclusion of carbon capture and storage under the CDM, fearing the 
technology’s impact on the current CDM portfolio that might lead to a ‘crowding out’ of 
other project types (IISD, 2006). While it supports the continued existence of the CDM 
after 2012, Brazil nevertheless is cautions, also in line with its stance on forests under the 
UNFCCC that “market mechanisms are part of an effective response, but are not the only 
answer. Climate protection is by far too important to be left solely in the hands of the 
market” (Vargas, 2007).  
Finally, on the issue of technology, Brazil’s stance appears rather little distinct from 
other developing country positions. In Bangkok, it emphasized considering not only new 
technologies, but also ways to disseminate and use existing ones and to explore ways to 
stimulate technological research in developing countries (IISD, 2008). It called for the 
development of innovative financial instruments, possibly in cooperation with the inter-
national financial institutions, for purchase and cheap licensing of technologies to devel-
oping countries (Vargas, 2007). Finally, it attributes high importance to the strengthen-
ing of South-South cooperation on technologies, without going into further specifics how 
exactly this could be achieved (Lula, 2007).  
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With respect to the case of Brazil, it is clear that the three aspects of perception—
affectedness, justice and equity, and opportunity—should primarily be looked at as com-
plementary rather than competitive. At the same time, however, it seems that the percep-
tion of justice still outweighs the perception of opportunity in driving Brazil's negotiating 
strategy. Looking at the potential benefits for the country arising from an inclusion of 
forests into the Kyoto framework, its hesitance to bind itself in this area appears not en-
tirely rational. This is all the more striking given the relatively strong domestic percep-
tion of affectedness: an inclusion of forests into the Kyoto regime would not only carry 
material benefits, but also credibly bind the government domestically and thereby 




The Brazilian government and a large part of its population regard climate change as a 
serious threat. Public opinion polls, active media and a high degree of social mobiliza-
tion testify to this fact, which is stronger than one might expect for a developing country 
with many other pressing concerns. Yet this is vindicated by the likely effects of global 
warming. Impacts of climate change are projected to be severe for the country, ranging 
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from major losses of biodiversity in the Amazon region, droughts in the North East, de-
creasing crop yields to an accelerated spread of tropical diseases.  
Thus, given the interest of the Brazilian public on this issue, the self-perception as a re-
gional leader and important spokesperson for developing countries, and the strong multi-
lateral orientation of Brazil's foreign policy more generally, pressure on the Brazilian 





As a developing country, Brazil sides with the G77 and China in its general framing of 
climate change. Attributing historical responsibility for the problem to the industrialized 
world, it emphasizes that any future agreement must be based on the principle of com-
mon but differentiated responsibilities, and that it would have to include 'positive incen-
tives' for developing countries. Its own record in decarbonising the country's energy ma-
trix provides it with additional arguments to demand decisive action from developed 
countries before committing itself to potentially costly policies. Brazil is particularly 
sensitive about its sovereignty being impaired through international involvement in the 
management of the Amazon, which it considers a vital national resource. This explains 
its categorical opposition to a market-based mechanism and the refusal to let developed 
nations 'buy themselves out' of their responsibilities through cheap forestry carbon cred-
its under a REDD mechanism.  
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Given the potential gains Brazil stands to win from a well designed post-2012 agree-
ment, its perception of opportunity is relatively weak, compared to the other two dimen-
sions. It certainly realizes the opportunities arising from its frontrunner role in biofuels 
production and use, and acknowledges the potential technological and financial benefits 
as a mature and stable host for CDM projects. Yet, to date, it seems to have perceived its 
rainforest more as a liability than an opportunity in the international climate negotiations, 
ignoring the substantial financial flows—and internal political impetus and support for 
effectively combating deforestation—that a REDD mechanism could provide. This is a 
point which European negotiators might want to stress more in future interactions with 
Brazil, perhaps in conjunction with the active domestic audiences that support decisive 
action on climate change and on halting deforestation.  
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The significance of the Russian Federation in regard to mitigating climate change 
through the international climate regime is recognized worldwide. The Russian Federa-
tion played a crucial role in the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol after the withdrawal of 
the United States. With its 5.3% of global GHG emissions, Russia’s participation was a 
precondition for the agreement to become legally binding (Perelet et al., 2007). In April 
2002, the Russian government began the ratification process however it delayed actual 
implementation of the Protocol until 2004 (at the urging of the EU). During the interven-
ing period between 2002 and 2004 the behaviour of Russia in the climate negotiations 
was characterized by a number of contradictory signals, ranging from support to indif-
ference (Buchner & Dall’Olio, 2005; Avdeeva, 2005) 
How can the contradictory negotiation position of Russia be explained? What were the 
motives for the delay in ratification and the quick turnaround? What are the factors shap-
ing the negotiation behaviour of the Russian Federation in the recent post-2012 negotia-
tions? The focus in this chapter is on the differences and similarities between the actual 
and perceived affectedness, equity and opportunity. We first provide a country profile 
with the help of key socio-economic indicators and data on energy and GHG emissions. 
Second, we assess the actual affectedness, the domestic framing of the issue and the ac-
tual opportunities for climate change mitigation. Third, we give an overview of the insti-
tutional context; the country’s international and domestic commitments on climate 
change and energy. Fourth, we examine the recent negotiation strategies and positions of 
the Russian Federation. Concluding, we will summarize the similarities and differences 






Russia’s population is estimated at around 144 million people and is distributed rather 
unevenly: the majority, 73% live in urban environments in the European/western portion 
of the country. While the average population density is estimated at 9 inhabitants per 
km2, these densities range from 328 inhabitants per km2 in Moscow to 1.2 inhabitants 
per km2 in far eastern Siberia (UNFCCC, 2004). The country has a very low population 
growth rate with even negative projections for the period 2005-2015.  
Following the end of the communist regime in 1991, the country experienced a severe 
economic decline characterized by high unemployment and large scale migration. In the 
period 1989-1998, GDP fell by 46%. In the period between 1998 and 2002 the economy 
boomed, peaking in 2000 at a 9% GDP growth, falling back to 4.3% in 2002 (UNFCCC, 
2004). The GDP growth rate in the period 1990-2005 of -0.1 % shows that the current 
GDP is approaching but has not yet reached the 1990 level.  
Institute for Environmental Studies 58
Russia is a developed country with a per capita GDP of US$ 5,336 or US$ 10,846 PPP, a 
high ranking of 67 on the human development index, but a low ranking compared to 
other Annex I countries. In comparison to 1990, the imports and exports of goods and 
services as a percentage of GDP have increased from 18% to 22% and 18% to 35% re-
spectively. However, despite the recent economic growth, 45.3% of the population lives 
on less than US$ 4 a day. 
Table 8.1 Socio-economic indicators. 
Population 2005  144.0 mln 
Annual population growth rate 0.2 (1975-2005) 
-0.5 (2005-2015) *1 
Urban population (% of total) *3 66.9 % (1975) 
73.2 % (2005) 
72.6 % (2015) *1 
GDP 2005 763.7 (US$ billions) 
1,552.0 (PPP US$ billions) 
GDP per capita 2005 5,336 (US$) 
10,845 (PPP US$) 
GDP growth rate (%)  -0.7 % (1975-2005) *4 
-0.1 % (1990-2005) *4 
Human development index 2005 (# and ranking) 0.802 (ranked 67, high human development) 
Population below 4 USD a day 2000-2004 (%) 
*2 
45.3 % 
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 
 
22 % (2005) 
18 % (1990) 
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 
 
35 % (2005) 
18 % (1990) 
Source: UNDP (2007). 
*1 Data refer to medium-variant projections. 
*2 Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified. 
*3 Because data are based on national definitions of what constitutes a city or metropolitan 
area, cross-country comparisons should be made with caution. 
*4 Data refer to a period shorter than that specified. 
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Russia compared to other countries is the third largest emitter of GHGs; after the United 
States and China. Despite an increase in GHG emissions due to the recent economic 
growth, their share in world GHG emissions is not predicted to change significantly in 
the near future (Perelet et al., 2007). The IEA projects that India’s share in global GHG 
emissions might surpass Russia in about 15 years. Figure 8.1 depicts the projection of 
the emissions without mitigation of major countries. 
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Figure 8.1 Business-as-usual CO2 emissions on a rising trend. Source: IEA (2006) in 
UNDP (2007). 
On a per capita basis the Russian emission rates are average for industrialized countries 
with low efficiency. Its emissions per capita are between world average and Annex I av-
erage (Höhne et al., 2007). In the period 1992-2004 the CO2 emission per capita de-
creased annually by 1.9% due to the economic crisis in the 1990s. The main driver of 
Russian emissions is the intensive use of gas for its economy, as expressed in the carbon 
intensity of growth. Russia’s carbon intensity exceeds leading European countries by 3.8 
times, the USA by 2.4 and the OECD countries by 2.6 times. As compared to other tran-
sition economies and developed countries joining the Kyoto Protocol, only Ukraine was 
more carbon intensive than Russia (Perelet et al., 2007).  
The energy sector plays an important role in Russia’s economy, accounting for 28% of 
its GDP. It is estimated that one-third of the world’s gas reserves and the world’s sec-
ond-largest remaining reserves of crude oil are within their territory. Russia’s increasing 
dependence on gas (now 53.9% of TPES) is an important factor contributing to its GHG 
emissions (see Figure 8.2). The majority of GHG emissions stem from electricity genera-
tion and heating (see Figure 8.3). In contrast with OECD-countries the sectoral break-
down of the total final consumption of energy has a much higher share in the residential 
sector and a much lower share for transport (UNFCCC, 2004). 
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Table 8.2 Energy and environment indicators. 
Electricity consumption per capita in kWh 6,425 (2004) 
Forest area % of total land area 47.9 % (2005) 
Forest area average annual change 1990-2005 0.0 (% annual change) 




CO2 emissions 2004 (Mt CO2) 1,524.1 (2004) 
1,984.1 (1990) *2 
-1.9 (% annual change) *3 
CO2 per capita (t CO2) 10.6 (2004) 
13.4 (1990) *2 
% of world total 
 
5.3 % (2004) 
8.8 % (1990) *2 
Carbon intensity of growth: CO2 emissions per unit 
of GDP (kt of CO2 per million 2000 PPP US$) 
1.17 (2004) (compare: OECD=0.45) 
1.61 (1990) *2 (compare: OECD=0.54) 
Source: UNDP (2007) 
*1 Total primary energy supply (TPES) is made up of ‘indigenous production + imports –  
exports - international marine bunkers ± stock changes’. TPES is a measure of commercial 
energy consumption. In some instances, the sum of the shares by energy source may not sum 
up to 100% because pumped storage generation has not been deducted from hydroelectricity 
generation. 
*2 In cases where data for 1990 are not available, data for the closest year between 1991 and 
1992 have been used. 



















Figure 8.2 Russian Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES). 
* 1 by source in 2005 (Source: based on IEA, 2007). 
* 1 Share of TPES excludes electricity trade. 
 
















Figure 8.3 Russian GHG emissions by sector in 2004 (excludes land use change) 





Territorially Russia is the world’s largest country, covering 13% of the Earth’s surface. 
Roughly 67% of the land area is under permafrost. Stretching from the pre-Caspian de-
serts to the Arctic tundra the climate varies widely across the country. Winter tempera-
tures can be as low as -51 °C in Siberia, while summer temperatures can be as high as 30 
°C in southern parts. Climate change therefore can have diverging long-term effects in 
the different ecosystems of the country (UNFCCC, 2004).  
The Russian government commission IGCE conducted an assessment of Russia’s physi-
cal vulnerability to climate change in 2002. The assessment focused in particular on four 
areas: the cryolite zone, agriculture, forestry and water resources. The cryolite zone 
compromises the upper layer of the Earth characterized by negative temperatures. It also 
encompasses the permafrost zone. In the cryolite zone, an annual increment of 0.02 °C to 
0.06 °C in air temperature is observed. Such increases can shift the border of solid cryo-
lite northwards by 200 km before the end of the century, resulting in major implications 
for existing infrastructure (UNFCCC, 2004). The overall balance of impacts on the agri-
culture is expected to be positive. A displacement of vegetation zones can be expected, 
with improvement of agricultural outputs in some areas and deterioration in others. 
However, assuming a doubling of CO2 concentrations, a 13% increase in productivity of 
forage crops and 11% increase in productivity of grain crops can be expected in the next 
40-50 years. Assuming that global warming could increase net CO2 removals, Russia can 
expect a major impact on forests in the long term. However, these effects are not ex-
pected to be important in the European part of Russia within 50 years. Climate change 
impacts in the form of increased precipitation already influences water resources, such as 
the Volga River and the Caspian Sea. An increase of 3-5 °C and an increase of precipita-
tion of 10-20% can mean an increase in the annual water flow by 25-40% in the Volga 
and 15-20% in the Enisei river basin. Some other regions of Siberia may experience 
more dryness (UNFCCC, 2004). A fifth area of expected impacts is human health. A 
sharp increase in air temperature may bring negative consequences, such as increases in 
intestinal infectious diseases, insect and tick infections (Perelet et al., 2007). 





Following the withdrawal of the United States from the Kyoto Protocol Russia, which 
accounted for 17.4% of 1990 emissions, became a key element to seeing that the Proto-
col came into force. After a considerable delay of two years the Russian Federation rati-
fied the Protocol in November 2004. Classified as an Annex I Party, Russia is obliged to 
stabilize emissions at 1990 levels. Since 1990 is the benchmark year for emission limits 
and Russia experienced a severe industrial decline after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Russia has considerable room to increase emissions before 2012. Between 1990 and 
2000 Russia’s emissions fell by approximately 30% (Henry & McIntosh Sundstrom, 
2007). Thus, Russia still has a surplus of unused emission allowances, which it could sell 
on the international emissions trading market. Despite economic growth, Russian GHG 
emissions in 2004 were still 33% below the Kyoto commitment. The Russian Federation 
can comply with the quantitative commitments without further domestic measures. Rus-
sia does however, experience difficulties in complying with the institutional criteria to be 
eligible to participate in the Kyoto mechanisms. The development of Russian compli-
ance mechanisms was considerably slow until 2006. Previously, Joint Implementation 
(JI) projects were halted by a lack of required national guidelines. Also a domestic emis-





The domestic Russian institutional basis for climate change mitigation was established 
with the creation of the Inter-Agency Commission on climate change problems (ICC) in 
1994. This commission is charged with “coordinating the work of the domestic agencies; 
coordinating the implementation of the UNFCCC in Russia; organizing and coordinating 
the Russian participation in the official activities of the UNFCCC and international co-
operation…” (Tangen et al., 2002: 33). The Commission is chaired by the head of Rus-
sian Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring (Roshydro-
met). In 1999, the more powerful Ministry of Economic Development and Trade 
(MEDT) became co-chair of the ICC. Several other ministries are involved in the proc-
ess, inter alia, the Ministry of Energy, the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs. Since the pre-COP-6 discussion on the Russian national position 
in the international negotiations the State Duma has played an active role in climate 
change issues (Tangen et al., 2002). Nevertheless, until the recent elections the executive 
branch under former President Putin (now Prime Minister) held considerable power 
within the political system. Thus while ratification of the Kyoto Protocol formally re-
quired the approval of the State Duma and Federation Council the final and critical deci-
sion was made by President Putin (Henry & McIntosh Sundstrom, 2007; Buchner & 
Dall’Olio, 2005). 
There are currently only few national climate mitigation measures in place. In 2005, a 
National Action Plan for Kyoto implementation was developed, but it failed to include 
concrete emissions reduction targets. The plan consists of four principal areas: imple-
menting policies aimed at reducing emissions and enhancing GHG absorption; the crea-
tion of a national system and inventory for the estimation of anthropogenic emissions by 
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source; elaboration of legislative and organizational backing of Russia’s participation in 
the Kyoto flexible mechanisms; and measures to support Russia’s international engage-
ment in the climate regime (Avdeeva, 2005). The plan has distributed responsibilities 
across ministries and called for the creation of an interdepartmental commission led by 
the MEDT.  
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In general the issue of climate change is not regarded as being a serious environmental 
problem. To this end it is not uncommon to hear many arguments propounding the po-
tential benefits that climate change could have on the country. Also many leading figures 
in the Russian scientific community and government institutions are known to be climate 
sceptics. For those who are indifferent or sceptical towards climate change, the climate 
regime is mainly perceived as a system for wealth redistribution. This behaviour corre-
sponds with a common attitude in Russia that humankind is the ‘ruler’ rather than the 




The legacy of inefficient energy production, transportation and consumption infrastruc-
ture from the Soviet era offers great opportunities for climate change mitigation in the 
field of technology. There is a large potential for emissions reduction through hosting 
Joint Implementation (JI) projects and embarking on emission trading (Korppoo & Moe, 
2007). Despite the large potential of JI and emission trading, these Kyoto mechanisms 
have not gained a strong support in Russia. The Russian Federation considers the bene-
fits of the mechanisms to be insignificant and the rules overly bureaucratic. This attitude 
is further reinforced by the recent economic growth and high export incomes. The fact 
that the benefits of JI would accrue in the private sector, outside the control of the gov-
ernment, also explains the government’s ambiguity towards investment in JI (Korppoo & 
Moe 2007). 
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In order to understand the negotiating position of Russia in the post-2012 negotiations 
we first must look at its role in the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. When Russia ini-
tially signed the Protocol in 1997 it expected to receive large benefits from quota sales to 
the United States. Together with other countries (Japan, Canada, Australia, Ukraine, 
New Zealand, Iceland and Norway) it teamed up with the United States in the Umbrella 
group, pushing for mechanisms for flexible implementation of commitments. When the 
US decided to withdraw from Kyoto in 2002, the relationship with the EU became more 
important. Knowing that the entry into force of the Protocol depended on their ratifica-
tion, Russia delayed its decision to ratify for more than two years. It demanded side 
payments, in particular from the EU (Bang et al., 2005). Fearing that binding emission 
targets would harm domestic economic growth, Russia attempted to ensure that it re-
ceived economic benefits from Kyoto’s flexible mechanisms. Russian officials “claimed 
that additional assurances of quota purchases or investments were necessary to secure 
Russian ratification” (Bang et al., 2005: 16). The ratification issue was politically up-
scaled when it was linked to the possible membership within the World Trade Organiza-
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tion. Although the EU initially and officially rejected the link to WTO membership, both 
issues were discussed at the 2004 EU-Russia summit. During the discussions the EU en-
dorsed possible WTO membership after Putin promised to speed up the process towards 
ratification (Bang et al., 2005; Buchner & Dall’Olio, 2005). Since ratification, Russian 
climate politics have been characterized by internal institutional battles on controlling 
positions in the future implementation of Kyoto mechanisms (Bang et al., 2005).  
Although Russia is an important player in the post-2012 negotiations, it is still unclear 
whether it will participate in the future process. Russia remains reluctant in taking on 
further binding commitments. A Russian MEDT senior officer remarked: “This will be a 
matter to be discussed at international negotiations. It depends whether we shall manage 
to protect our interests or not. Then we shall think if it is worthwhile to join the next pe-
riod” (Perelet et al., 2007: 23). The domestic debate on the Russian position in the post-
2012 negotiations has not yet started. The Russian Federal Service for Hydrometeorol-
ogy and Environmental Monitoring (Roshydromet) has initiated talks on future voluntary 
targets for non-Annex I Parties (Korppoo & Moe, 2007: 7). However, this proposal re-
ceived criticism from non-Annex I Parties claiming that it distracts attention from the 
important task of negotiating further commitments by Annex I Parties (UNFCCC, 
2007f). The fear that the role of the country could turn from a seller of emission credits 
to a buyer soon after 2012, because of the economic growth, could be a major issue in 
the future negotiations. However, following the government emission scenario this could 
only happen in a third commitment period beyond 2020. It seems unlikely that Russia 
will be allowed to have such a strong negotiation position as with the Kyoto Protocol. 
Russia might thus expect fewer co-benefits from the future climate regime. Continued 
Russian participation will probably rely on Russian public opinion and thus on aware-
ness of climate change effects on Russian territory, which as we have stated is low 





Russia’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol was not driven by a perception of urgency or 
affectedness. There is little awareness of the vulnerabilities or the effects climate change 
will have on the country. Climate changes have already affected permafrost zones and 
water resources, such as the Volga River and the Caspian Sea. However, the issue of 
climate change vulnerability is not yet perceived as being of importance. This attitude is 
further enforced by the scepticism of many leading figures working on climate change in 
the Russian scientific community and government institutions. However, new survey 
data suggests that the Russian public is rapidly becoming more concerned about climate 
change impacts. A GlobeScan survey found that 59% of Russians considered climate 
change a ‘very serious’ problem, up from 43% in 2003 (Henry & McIntosh Sundstrom, 
2007). Future Russian participation in the post-Kyoto regime will probably rely on 
whether this trend towards greater awareness of climate change effects among the Rus-
sian public can be sustained. 




Perceptions of justice and equity do not seem to play an important role in the negotiation 
strategies and positions of the Russian Federation.  
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Perceptions of opportunity obviously played an important role in Russia’s ratification of 
the Kyoto Protocol. Being aware of its crucial role in the entry into force of the Protocol, 
Russia was assured of promising economic benefits provided by the Kyoto mechanisms. 
More importantly, Russia’s strategy in the Kyoto negotiations can be considered an issue 
linkage. Russia secured EU support for its bid to enter into the World Trade Organiza-
tion by linking it to the Kyoto ratification issue. As a result of this process Russia and the 
EU have been brought closer together; sharing more common interests with each other 
than in previous negotiations. However, it is still unclear whether Russia will participate 
in the post-Kyoto process. Future Russian participation in the post-Kyoto regime will 
probably depend on whether the EU is able to convince Russia of the real benefits of 
hosting Joint Implementation (JI) projects and an emission trading system. 





This chapter focuses on Mexico, one of the two OECD countries that did not take on tar-
gets under the Kyoto Protocol. Mexico has been called one of the leaders of the develop-
ing countries in taking on climate change, even though it is one of the most important oil 
producers in the world.  
This chapter provides an overview of the social and political factors relevant to Mexico’s 
position in the post-2012 negotiations, and provides an indication of Mexico’s behaviour 
so far in these negotiations. We first begin with a short country profile of Mexico, focus-
ing on key socio-economic and climate change and energy indicators as well as it affect-
edness to climate change. We then give an overview of the country’s international com-
mitments and the domestic climate change and energy policies. Against this background 
we examine what the current negotiation position of Mexico has been since COP-11. On 
the basis of the foregoing analysis, the country’s perceptions on equity, opportunity and 







Mexico has a population of approximately 107 million in a territory of approximately 2 
million square kilometres. The annual population growth rate is 1.18%. Of the total 
population, a quarter lives in rural areas. The number of households is close to 24 million 
(INEGI, 2007 in: De Buen, 2007). About half of the population lives in poverty. Table 
9.1 provides some key indicators of the socio-economic position of Mexico.  
Table 9.1 Overview of selected energy indicators for Mexico. 
Population 2006  107 million  
Population growth 2000 – 2005 1,26% 
Unemployment rate - 2004  3.8 
Illiteracy rate - 2005  7.4 
Population in conditions of poverty 2004 47% 
GDP PPP——2005 (US$)  $1.068 trillion  
GDP official rate 2005 (US$)  $669.5 billion  
GDP per capita 2005 (US$)  $10,100  
GDP growth rate - 2006 4.8 
Sources: (WRI 2003, in: Pulver; 2006; De Buen, 2007). 
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Mexico is one of the most important oil producers in the world, with an average daily 
production of 3.8 million barrels. 47% of this is for domestic consumption. Natural gas 
consumption averaged 4.8 billion cubic feet per day in 2005, mostly as gas associated 
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with oil production (BP, 2006, in: De Buen, 2007). Mexico was fourteenth worldwide in 
proven crude oil reserves in 2006, and sixth among oil producing countries in 2005. 
Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) was the third largest oil company worldwide in 2004 
(INE-SEMARNAT, 2006). Table 9.2 presents an overview of some energy indicators.  
Table 9.2 Overview of selected energy indicators for Mexico. 
CO2 Emissions in 1999 (million metric tons)  358  
CO2 emission/capita 1999 (metric tons per person)  3.7  
Total energy consumption 1999 (metric tons of oil equivalent)  149 million  
Energy Intensity/GDP PPP 1999 (metric tons of oil equivalent/US$)  169  
Sources: (WRI 2003, in: Pulver; 2006; De Buen, 2007). 
Mexico ranks twelfth in the world based on total greenhouse gas emissions and is the 
second largest emitter in Latin America after Brazil. As shown in Figure 9.1, Mexico ac-
counts for 1.4% of global CO2 emissions from fossil fuels, excluding other GHGs and 
land-use change and forestry (World Bank, 2008). 
 
Figure 9.1 Mexico’s Share of CO2 Emissions in 2005 (as percentage of world  
emissions, excluding land-use change and forestry) (Source: Energy  
Information Administration US Department of Energy. In: World Bank, 
2008). 
Energy production contributed to 24% of the country’s total emissions in 2002; transport 
18%; fossil fuel consumption for manufacturing and construction 8%; residential, com-
mercial and agricultural sectors, 5%; and fugitive methane emissions, 6%. Together, 
fixed and area sources (including energy generation, manufacturing and the construction 
industry and other energy sectors, not including transport) represented 37% of the total. 
GHG emissions in the energy category, expressed in CO2-eq., showed an increase from 
312,027 Gg to 389,497 Gg from 1990 to 2002, which represents a 25% increase (INE-
SEMARNAT, 2006). 
Mexico’s GHG emissions have been growing steadily over the past 25 years as depicted 
in Figure 9.2. 
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Figure 9.2  Mexico’s CO2 Emissions from Fossil Fuels (excluding other GHG and  
land-use change)(Source: Energy Information Administration, US Depart-
ment of Energy. In: World Bank, 2008). 
In 2004, the national energy consumption was 6,816 Petajoules (PJ), which is 5.3% more 
than in 2003. The production of primary energy in 2004 was 10,331 PJ; this represents 
an increase of 2.6% compared to 2003. 35.1% of the national energy consumption is 
used for the energy sector itself and 64.5% for total final consumption. Particularly no-
ticeable was the 13.5% growth in the consumption of the transport sector, mainly due to 
the consumption of gasoline and diesel. The results of the NGHGI 1990-2002, indicate 
that the growth in emissions for the sectors, except for LULUCF, in CO2 eq, was ap-






















Figure 9.3 Mexico Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES) by source in 2005  
(Source: based on IEA, 2007). 
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In terms of energy conservation, renewable energy and cogeneration issues, the country 
has a somewhat complex situation. On the one hand, Mexico has energy efficiency and 
conservation programs in place that have been very successful. On the other hand, re-
newable energy and cogeneration still make a relatively small contribution to the na-
tional energy supply. Policies have either not been put in place or have failed to fulfil 
their objectives. While several reasons could account for this, the most significant is by 
far the abundance of oil reserves. Moreover, energy supply companies are state-owned 
monopolies that contribute heavily to the national budget through their sale of oil. The 
fact then that there are few advances with regard to renewable energy production and 
supply would appear to be a result of this situation (De Buen, 2007). The energy saving 
efforts are however, not only directly driven by an interest in reducing CO2 emissions. 
They are also the result of the increasingly higher prices of natural gas and electricity 
over the last few years. In some cases, especially for companies with international opera-
tions, the efforts could also be driven by environmental policies defined by their head-





Based on global modelling simulations, Mexico will be disproportionately affected by 
climate change. The three Mexican regions most vulnerable are, in order of importance: 
Central, Northern and Tabasco Coast (Conde & Gay, 1999).  
One of the projections for Mexico’s climate is that is will have more rain leading to 
floods in some regions. Other regions are expected to have less rain; this is expected to 
cause more frequent and severe droughts (World Bank, 2008). Mexico City is already 
facing water shortages, which could be aggravated by an increase in temperature through 
decreased recharge of the city’s aquifers and an increase in evapotranspiration (INE-
SEMARNAT, 2006). Under all climate change scenarios, extreme weather events such 
as hurricanes are expected to increase. The country’s large and relatively exposed coast-
line along the Gulf of Mexico is a frequent landfall point for hurricanes. The cost of hur-
ricanes and tropical storms has already steadily increased (World Bank, 2008).  
Projected sea-level rise will lead to further impacts on the Gulf Coast and on Mexico 
City. The Tabasco State coast will be most vulnerable to sea-level changes. Approxi-
mately 40 to 50km of inland sea penetration is predicted. Northern and Central regions 
are most vulnerable in the agricultural sector, according to application of a crop simula-
tion model (Conde & Gay, 1999). National Communications report that sea-level rise is 
likely to have adverse impacts on buildings and tourism (UNFCCC, 2007e). 
The occurrence of Dengue fever is at this moment increasing in Mexico, the number of 
cases increased by more than 600% between 2001 and 2007. This expansion could be 
linked to climate change (The Lancet, 2008).  
Mexico is also one of the world’s most important biodiversity hotspots. Severe species 
loss is predicted in the future (UNFCCC, 2007e). For example, rainfall patterns are 
changing, and this is causing pests such as the roundheaded pine beetle, European mis-
tletoe and caterpillars to attack the forests of Sierra Gorda (IPS Latin America, 2007). 
The Mesoamerican coral reefs are also likely to be affected (UNFCCC, 2007e). Man-
grove forests located in low-lying coastal areas are particularly vulnerable to sea-level 
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rise, increased mean temperatures, and hurricane frequency and intensity (Magrin et al. 
2007 in: UNFCCC, 2007e) and could disappear. Fish stocks are also affected by warmer 






Mexico ratified the UNFCCC in 1993 and the Kyoto Protocol in 2000 (Martinez, 2004). 
It submitted its first National Communication in 1997, the second in 2001 and the third 
in 2006, as the only developing country until now to do so (World Bank, 2008). In addi-
tion to these multilateral treaties, Mexico has a number of bilateral agreements with 
countries such as Japan, the US and Canada. Research funds from developed countries 
have helped Mexico to prepare GHG indexes and research into adaptation strategies. 
Mexico, together with Cuba is part of the Capacity-Building Project for Stage II adapta-
tion to climate change in Central America, where it helps other countries to prepare ad-
aptation plans and strategies (UNFCCC, 2007e). Recently, the World Bank endorsed a 
Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for Mexico, which entails a loan to provide flexible, 
on-demand advisory services and technical assistance (States News Service, 2008). Most 
new activities on climate change appear to be driven by bilateral initiatives. In 2003, the 
United States and Mexico pledged to strengthen bilateral cooperation on climate change, 
creating a Bilateral Working Group on Climate Change. Canada and Mexico signed a 
joint statement on climate change cooperation during COP/MOP 1 in December 2005 
(Pulver, 2006). At the G8 Heiligendamm Summit in 2007, Brazil, China, India, South 





Interest in climate change in Mexico dates back to the early 1990s and now several poli-
cies are in place. The most salient are outlined below.  
Over the past 15 years, the National Commission for Energy Savings (CONAE) and the 
Trusteeship for Electric Energy Savings (FIDE) have been implementing programs for a 
more sustainable use of energy, which have been very successful (De Buen, 2007):  
• Thermal insulation of homes; 
• The introduction of highly efficient air conditioning equipment; 
• The replacement of 500 thousand incandescent fixtures by fluorescent ones in  
residential lighting; 
• Cogeneration; 
• The issuing of 20 official norms on energy saving for household appliances and other 
products. It is estimated that the energy savings accumulated over the last five years 
deriving from the programs mentioned reached 39 thousand GWh, which translates 
to a reduction of a little over 24 million tons of CO2.  
During the year 2000 alone the country had energy savings equivalent to 11 thousand 
GWh. This is a reduction of almost 7 million tons of CO2 with respect to the baseline of 
1990 (Martinez, 2004). 
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In the sector of land use, change in land use, and forests, the main strategies are: 
•  Increasing the rate of accumulation of carbon, by creating or increasing sinks; 
•  Reducing the rate of carbon liberation already fixed in existing sinks; and 
•  Reducing the use of fossil fuels and intensifying that of renewable products. 
The main achievements over the past few years in conserving forest ecosystems include: 
• The reforestation of more than 740 thousand hectares (Pronare Program); 
• Forest planting of more than 47 thousand hectares between 1997-2003 (Prodeplan 
Program); 
• Reclamation of over 1.3 million hectares of agricultural lands for forestry production 
(Martinez, 2004). 
While renewable energy has a very high potential in Mexico, this potential has yet to be 
realized. A law promoting renewable energy has been in discussion for three years, how-
ever no decision has been made. This is probably due to opposition of the national oil 
company Pemex (De Buen, 2007). 
Mexico's Climate Change Strategy identifies measures, establishes emissions reduction 
ranges and proposes studies to define precise mitigation goals. It proposes strategic and 
political actions that will serve as the basis for the national climate change program, 
which is part of the national development plan. The strategy consists of two parts – the 
‘green agenda’ and ‘grey agenda’ – which respectively correspond to vegetation and 
land use requirements, and power generation. The grey agenda calls for power genera-
tion using renewable sources, efficient energy consumption and reduction of contami-
nants in gasoline (Business News Americas, 2007).  
Among indirect actions of emissions reduction -maintaining captured carbon-, the fol-
lowing programs were continued: Forest Development Project in the Conservation and 
Sustainable Management of Forest Resources (Procymaf II) in its second stage (2004-
2007); Programs of Payment for Hydrological Environmental Services (PSAH); and the 
Program of Conservation and Reforestation of Forest Ecosystems (Procoref). Actions 
were expanded in the phytosanitary diagnosis and treatment of forests and rainforests. 
The surface area under protection increased through the National System of Protected 
Natural Areas, as well as the number and surface area of Units for Wildlife Management 
and Use (UMA) (INE-SEMARNAT, 2006). The ProArbol initiative, announced in 2007, 
offers financial incentives to farmers who plant and care for trees. In total the initiative 
hopes to plant 250 million trees. The program has already received approximately 
80,000 applications, three times what officials were projecting (Chicago Tribune  
(Illinois), 2007) 
Building national capacity is also an important aspect of the policies regarding climate 
change (UNFCCC, 2005b). Regarding education, training and public awareness, Mexico 
has substantially increased the number of forums, workshops and publications intended 
for the public in general and the country’s decision-makers in particular. At the same 
time, a great deal of information related to climate change has been made available to the 
public through the Internet. It includes research results, statistics and electronic versions 
of publications produced by the government, research institutions, NGOs and the private 
sector (INE-SEMARNAT, 2006). 
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Mexico’s National Development Plan 2001–2006 includes strategies to reduce vulner-
ability to climate change, strategies, which resulted in small farm sector intensification; 
improved employment opportunities in commercial agriculture; growth of rural non-farm 
sector; migration of the young; and provision of safety nets for those trapped in poverty 
(Tearfund, 2006). A shift towards prevention in disaster management has led to the crea-
tion of scientific advisory committees, improved engineering standards, inter alia, retro-
fitting schools to withstand high winds, and hospital readiness standards (Tearfund, 
2006). 
Within North America, Mexico is unique for the absence of a civil society-led campaign 
around climate change. Climate change is not a priority issue for environmental NGOs in 
Mexico. There is little public pressure for action on climate change. Most Mexican 
NGOs focus their efforts on environmental concerns that are perceived as more pressing 
and deserving of attention (Pulver, 2006). 
Based on an assessment by the Climate Performance Index, an independent body that as-
sesses a country’s overall climate performance based on per capita GHG emission trends 
in the energy, transport, residential and industrial sectors; absolute energy related GHG 
emissions; and climate policy; Mexico ranked fourth in the world behind Sweden, Ger-
many and Iceland (World Bank, 2008). 
The Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT) is responsible 
for leading national policy regarding the environment. The Under Ministry of Planning 
and Environmental Policy of SEMARNAT has the General Directorate for Climate 
Change Projects and is in charge of promoting and facilitating the development of pro-
jects for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The International Affairs Coordi-
nating Unit (UCAI) has the promotion and organization of the participation of the Minis-
try and of its de-concentrated bodies in international meetings or forums as a duty, in co-
ordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE) (INE-SEMARNAT, 2006).  
In 2005, the Inter Ministerial Commission on Climate Change (CICC) was created. It in-
cludes among its members seven ministries: agriculture, transport, social development, 
environment, energy, economy, and foreign affairs (Pulver, 2006). CICC is a permanent 
body in charge of coordinating the actions of the offices and entities of the Federal Pub-
lic Administration. Also in 2005, the Ministry of Energy (SENER) created the Climate 
Change Committee of the Energy Sector. It aims at being the coordination mechanism 
for the follow-up, analysis and definition of policies and activities related to Climate 
Change and CDM in the Energy Sector. It also aims at coordinating actions on climate 
change with SEMARNAT. The National Institute of Ecology (INE) is in charge of the 
Coordination of the Program on Climate Change (INE-SEMARNAT, 2006). 
Institutional fragmentation is a barrier to mainstreaming climate change adaptation in 
Mexico (Pulver, 2006; Tearfund, 2006). Climate change adaptation is isolated from the 
development agenda by its institutional location within the environmental ministry, 
which has little influence over other government departments. A further problem is that 
of political discontinuity, which hinders a long-term approach to reducing climate risk 
(Tearfund, 2006). Given inter-ministerial competition at the federal level and the absence 
of civil society interest in climate change, the private sector remains as the most promis-
ing sector in which to promote bottom-up action on climate change in Mexico in the 
short term (Pulver, 2006). 
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The overall stance of the Mexican government has been that climate change is a serious 
environmental issue. Mexico perceives a greater risk from climate change impacts than 
from adverse economic effects of greenhouse gas regulation (Pulver, 2006). President 
Calderón said in a speech that:  
“Climate change involves the future of humanity, the future existence of our nation 
and the destiny of our children and grandchildren. Putting an end to the problem of 
global warming requires the commitment of society throughout the world, as well as 
the commitment of governments.” (Presidentia, 2007b) 
The President has also said: “climate change is real, measurable and constitutes one of 
the greatest challenges facing mankind” (Presidentia, 2007d).  
The Mexican government is convinced that both developed and developing nations 
should contribute to global efforts to combat climate change (Presidentia, 2007c). In the 
words of the president: “we share the idea that all countries, without exception, have 
something to do. We have a duty towards the protection of the earth and the containment 
of the problem of climate change” (Presidentia, 2007a). Mexico sees the UN principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities as fundamental to a just climate regime. It 
agrees on the importance of seeking a post -2012 agreement and is willing to participate 
in the joint adoption of long-term global goals, and to help achieve them, “in keeping 
with its capacities and level of development” (Presidentia, 2007d).  
But, as a developing country, Mexico adopts poverty eradication as an absolute priority, 
and avoids policies that may jeopardize economic growth. As such, climate change is 
both a threat and an opportunity to foster sustainable development, given that Mexico is 
an oil-exporting nation (UNFCCC, 2005b). 
Equity concerns are essential to Mexico, and per capita emissions and their evolution 
should, according to F. Tudela, Under minister for Planning and Environmental Policy of 
SEMARNAT, play a more central role in the international regime, “on the basis of flexi-
ble convergence in accordance with national circumstances” (UNFCCC, 2005b). Mexico 
sees GHG mitigation in developed countries as the key to addressing climate change 
given the perceived historical responsibilities. Developed countries must take the lead by 
making further truly significant commitments at an early date for GHG reductions in the 
period beyond 2012 (Joint Position Paper, 2007). 
Mexico, in a joint position paper with other influential developing countries, has ex-
pressed the need to make the structures of global governance more democratic, represen-
tative and legitimate by increasing the participation of developing countries in the deci-







For Mexico, assistance from other countries is needed to address the issues of mitigation 
and adaptation properly. Mexico and other developing countries also state in a joint  
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position paper that in order for developing countries to contribute to the efforts to ad-
dress climate change, access to adequate technology is a key enabling condition. They 
state the need for an agreement on transfer of technologies at affordable costs for accel-
erated mitigation efforts in developing countries. According to this paper, capacity build-
ing efforts are also needed to enhance developing countries’ capacities to deploy mitiga-
tion and adaptation technologies (Joint Position Paper, 2007). The resources required for 
adaptation are not less than those for mitigation. The countries jointly propose that re-
sources from the entire carbon market should be mobilized, as is being done on a small 
scale from the 2% levy on the CDM proceeds. These resources should be separate from 
the provision of new and additional resources to tackle the challenges of adaptation. 
They do not see a diversion of ODA resources as the proper answer as development is a 
prerequisite for achieving effective adaptation (Joint Position Paper, 2007).  
Possible actions Mexico could need in order to overcome barriers that restrict the devel-
opment of Mexico’s potential in mitigation and adaptation policies are:  
• Assistance in the development of technical an institutional capacities to design,  
implement and manage projects and programs;  
• Evaluation of renewable energy resources in Mexico;  
• Greater application of CDM;  
• More detailed analyses of costs of distributed power generation vs. central  
generation; 
• Promotion of best practices for Mexico’s industrial and commercial sectors;  
• Support the development of public policies that facilitate and accelerate technology 
adoption;  
• Support the development of public policies that mandate distributed generation; 
• Support the development of public policies that mandate renewable energy use  
(De Buen, 2007). 
The third National Communication indicates that Mexico requires financing to expand 
national actions in the identification of programs and projects leading to emissions re-
duction by sources. Funds are also needed to identify options for carbon sequestration 
sinks; and in order to select and implement adaptation actions. These will include spe-
cific technologies to be used, materials and equipment required, and techniques and 
practices necessary for applying them. The National Climate Change Strategy also re-
quires funding for monitoring and evaluating its further development and for undertaking 
the implementation of new projects (INE-SEMARNAT, 2006). 
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A cornerstone of Mexico’s interest in the Kyoto Protocol was access to Kyoto mecha-
nisms, in particular CDM. When the US failed to ratify the Protocol, expectations of the 
potential size of CDM collapsed. This caused a delay in ratification of the Protocol by 
the Mexican government. Only after the EU had ratified and CDM became a viable 
mechanism again, did Mexico finally ratify (Pulver, 2006).  
Currently, about 7% of the registered CDM projects are implemented in Mexico this is 
far short of the full potential that CDM could offer. Minister F. Tudela indicated in a 
speech that: 
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“Mexico, like other Latin American countries, supports the CDM, but considers that 
while CDM is useful for inducing positive institutional arrangements, it has largely 
failed to live up to expectations. Its effectiveness is perceived as relatively poor, its 
transaction costs are high and it has the potential to become a perverse incentive, lim-
iting developing countries’ mobilization of their own full potential, when improved 
national legislation and policies threaten to undermine the requisite proof of addi-
tionality for individual CDM projects” (UNFCCC. 2005b). 
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Mexico has made substantial efforts in re- and afforestation projects. In total, 250 million 
trees are to be planted under the Proarbol project, and farmers will be rewarded for main-
taining the trees on their property. This enormous project creates opportunities for tour-
ism. The Mexican government sees sustainable tourism as one of the most promising 
sectors, where the challenge is to continue constructing hotel and tourist infrastructure 




Mexico has benefited from international partnerships and funding in their current climate 
policies. Institutes from governments and private parties abroad have been helping Mex-
ico in their GHG inventories and other research activities (INE-SEMARNAT, 2006).  
As stated above, bilateral agreements on climate change are an important element of 
Mexico’s climate policy. However these agreements also serve as fora for issues that fall 
outside the direct scope of climate. For example, during the two-way climate talks be-
tween Japan and Mexico preceding the Bali COP, ministers Komura and Espinosa also 
agreed to boost the ‘strategic partnership’ through political dialogues and a Japan-
Mexico free trade agreement (Japan Economic Newswire, 2007).  
With the increase in sub- national climate change activities in the United States, there are 
many prospects for partnerships for Mexico. Activities in the transportation and energy 
sectors that link US NGOs with business and industry actors in Mexico are particularly 
promising. Such activities could build on pre-existing environmental arrangements such 
as air pollution control activities in Mexico City or on the US-Mexico border (Pulver, 
2006). 
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As the only two members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) that did not take on targets under the Kyoto Protocol, Mexico and South 
Korea will be at the forefront of negotiations regarding developing-country targets (Pul-
ver, 2006). Mexico’s environment minister has emphasized that his country and other 
developing countries expect to be part of a post-2012 regime. “We are not, and we will 
not be a free rider of any regime”. Furthering that Mexico is “ready to consider sectoral 
targets in terms of GHG intensity” (Carbon Control News, 2007). 
Mexico’s medium to long-term strategy on climate change includes the need for greater 
differentiation of responsibilities among advanced developing nations. The minister of 
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environment proposes a differentiated multi-stage approach for developing countries 
based on their economic and social condition with varying degrees of commitments and 
timelines accorded (Carbon Control News, 2007).  
Other parties’ non-compliance should not affect Mexico’s own compliance; it could af-
fect the scope of its commitments, although Mexico is against sanctions for non-
compliance. The minister of SEMARNAT has indicated that while Mexico foresees 
some limited success in mitigation achievements, it will require international support to 
go beyond these: Mexico considers that over-compliance should win compensation 
(UNFCCC, 2005b). 
The minister of environment has also indicated that some economic sectors may be ready 
for GHG controls (Carbon Control News 2007). Mexico commends combining soft and 
hard technologies in the development of risk atlases and early warning systems, which 
have resulted in greater attention and resource allocation to risk prevention (UNFCCC, 
2007e). 
During 2008 UNFCCC negotiations, Mexico has been actively proposing the following 
points: 
• Supporting the development and implementation of methods and tools at the local 
level (IISD, 2008a); 
• During the UNFCCC negotiations, there should be sessions on mitigation and  
adaptation respectively, with technology and finance to be considered in each (IISD 
2008b);  
• The creation of a multilateral fund under the Convention “with foreseeable and  
scalable contributions by developed countries and a transparent and inclusive  
governance structure” (IISD, 2008c); 
• The need to improve observation systems and analysis, and planning scenarios; 
• The need to strengthen national and regional capabilities; adaptation measures must 
meet sustainable development objectives and goals, including poverty reduction and 
access to basic services (IISD, 2008a); 
• Timely development of information systems for forecasts and applying disaster  
prevention plans so communities can protect themselves (IISD 2008a); 






Mexico perceives it will be hit hard by climate change. Increases in temperature will 
mean changes in rainfall patterns: floods and droughts, accompanied by pests, and ex-
treme weather events. Climate change is expected to have a negative impact on agricul-
ture and fishery sectors. Biodiversity in this unique hotspot is also likely to be negatively 
effected by changes in climate. Coral reefs, mangrove forests and rainforests are threat-
ened. Sea-level rise will have a large impact on the low-lying coastal areas. Mexico City 
will face increased water shortages. To this degree then Mexico has taken the position 
that protection of climate is in many regards a more salient issue than that of economic 
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growth as any negative consequences from climate change will have a greater impact on 




Mexico is stepping up as a global leader in tackling climate change, especially among 
the developing nations. It perceives the problem of climate change as a real danger that 
must be acted on by all. Common but differentiated responsibilities for the world’s na-
tions are important for Mexico: as the developed countries historically contributed most 
to the problem, they should be the ones doing most to amend it. Also in the developing 
countries, divisions should be made among the largest and smallest emitters, and reduc-
tion targets should be adjusted accordingly. Global governance should be organized 
more democratically, representatively and legitimately by increased participation of de-
veloping countries. Interestingly however, it must be noted that this argument is pro-
pounded despite Mexico’s role in oil production and export. 
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Climate change presents not only threats to Mexico: it also brings opportunities. Interna-
tional cooperation, through mechanisms like CDM, technology transfer, bilateral agree-
ments which also cover free trade and sustainable tourism could help Mexico in address-
ing both climate change and poverty eradication.  




In this section we attempt to offer a profile of the United States. Given that the US is the 
world’s leading economy, historically the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, the most 
recalcitrant party in the international negotiations on climate change, and is seen by 
many as the most important political entity for furthering any post-2012 agreement, we 
have taken a slightly different approach in this section as compared to the profiles above. 
Rather than beginning with the presentation of the socio-economic indicators, much of 
which are known, if not in detail, then at minimum in their scope, we will begin with 
how we believe the US frames the issue of climate change for itself using what indica-
tors are necessary to frame our story. We also take a more discursive tone in this profile 
as it is our belief that since the US is in many respects a unique actor on the world stage, 
their thinking on climate change and the post-2012 regime warrants a different type of 
analysis. 
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“We believe we need to strengthen our energy security. We believe we need to grow 
our economy. And we believe the only way to achieve these goals is through contin-
ued advances in technology. So we've pursued a series of policies aimed at encourag-
ing the rise of innovative as well as more cost-effective clean energy technologies 
that can help America and developing nations reduce greenhouse gases, reduce our 
dependence on oil, and keep our economies vibrant and strong for decades to come.” 
(US President George W. Bush, 16 April 2008) 
This recent quote from US President Bush illustrates rather succinctly how the current 
US administration outwardly frames the issue of global climate change. While climate 
change is viewed as an environmental problem, the underpinnings of the problem are 
bounded by issues of energy and economic security. The title of the US’ main climate 
policy strategy, “US Actions to Address Energy Security, Clean Development, and Cli-
mate Change” further enforces this view. Energy security or continued access to inex-
pensive and abundant energy fuels has long been a concern of the United States and has 
driven much of their foreign and domestic policy for the past 100 years (Yergin, 1992). 
As a result of having had what they viewed as unlimited access to fuels such as coal and 
oil (oil currently accounts for almost 60% of their total primary energy supply (WRI, 
2008), has enabled the United States in their opinion to become the world’s economic 
leader. Compared to other countries the US, with the exception of China, has the largest 
share of emissions in the manufacturing and construction sector at 677 MtC02 in 2004 
and the largest share of emissions in the transportation sector with some 1,800 MtCo2 
(ibid.). 
Climate change or more specifically measures to mitigate climate change, with the need 
to divest dependence on fossil fuels, is seen as a direct challenge to the US’ economic 
and political hegemony and the dynamic of squaring of economic concerns against those 
of ‘global warming’, as it was it was commonly referred to, have been voiced since the 
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1997. Nevertheless, as is seen from the President’s remarks, the US recognizes the need 
to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. This need we posit, however, is not primarily out 
of environmental concerns (though they exist) but is rather a by-product of its need to 
divest itself from its dependence on ‘foreign’ oil due to economic and political concerns. 
The path that the US has chosen to achieve these goals is through innovative technologi-
cal advancement, the underlying message being that climate change is a technological 
problem that can be solved in a mechanistic manner. Framing the issue in this manner 
opens up avenues for continued economic advancement through the stimulus of domestic 
research and development funding and the potential for increased exports of environ-
mentally friendly technologies, goods and services. Moreover, it shifts the debate away 
from the common understanding that climate change mitigation need be addressed 
through a negotiated cap-and-trade agreement.  
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Institutionally, despite its past pariah-like status in the international negotiations, the US 
and the Bush Administration have taken great efforts to showcase their actions in ad-





Domestically, greenhouse gases and their emissions are not regulated under US envi-
ronmental legislation (i.e. Clean Air Act, National Environmental Policy Act, Endan-
gered Species Act, and Clean Water Act). While legal efforts have been made to classify 
GHGs as pollutants, thus bringing them under the jurisdictions of environmental law and 
subsequently requiring that they be regulated by the federal government (specifically the 
Environmental Protection Agency) in all sectors of the economy, these efforts have not 
been entirely successful. Legally the majority of climate policy is contained in energy 
legislation and is implemented by various US departments and agencies across the gov-
ernment. In addition to President Bush’s new goal to, “stop the growth of U.S. green-
house gas emissions by 2025”,5 flagship national domestic policies include, inter alia: 
standards on fuel economy for certain vehicles of 35 miles per gallon (14.8 litres per 
kilometre) by 2020; production of 36 billion gallons (136 billion litres) of “renewable 
fuels” by 2022; 70% improvement in lighting efficiency by 2020; improved energy effi-
ciency standards in appliances; improved building codes for energy efficiency increased 
production of renewable energy; and development of “clean coal” technologies. As the 
government has stated on many of occasions, these goals are to be reached through in-
creased technological development in both the public and private sector. To that end the 
government has, inter alia, made available US$ 42.5 billion in loan guarantees for the 
deployment of clean energy technologies and invested some US$ 4 billion in energy 
technology research over the past seven years.  
At the state level, a cap-and-trade scheme has been introduced in nine North-eastern 
states (the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative) (Rodi et al. 2006), which could possibly 
be linked to the EU trading scheme in the future (Mehling 2007). Furthermore,  
                                                  
5  See http://www.whitehouse.gov (“President Bush Discusses Climate Change”, April 16, 
2008). 
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California has put in place legislation mandating regulations and market-based mecha-
nisms to achieve a 25% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2020.6 In addition, 
municipalities have started to take action. For example, in April 2007, New York’s 
mayor Michael Bloomberg announced he would work to reduce the city’s emissions by 
30% by 2030 (CSM 2007). 
Various non-state actors, including business and non-governmental organizations, have 
also actively taken up the issue of climate change, in order to, amongst others, benefit 
from ‘first mover’ behaviour. Perhaps the most prominent example of this is the Chicago 
Climate Exchange, a voluntary emissions trading scheme, with self-imposed binding 
caps for its business members. 
-! #

Internationally, while the US has been a signatory to the framework convention since 
1992 they have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol. As is evidenced by their actions in Bali 
however, it would appear that the US is becoming more open to engaging the interna-
tional community as a whole in the post-2012 negotiations. Historically, the Bush ad-
ministration has not used the UNFCCC forum as the primary arena to promote its inter-
national climate policy agenda but has tended to engage in regional and bilateral partner-
ships in parallel. To date they partnered with some 15 countries. The most notable of 
these being the Major Economies Process on Energy Security and Climate Change 
whereby they have initiated a series of meetings with 17 of the world’s largest econo-
mies to discuss ostensibly the global architecture of a post-2012 climate agreement; The 
Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate to promote the creation and 
implementation of new clean energy technologies on a voluntary basis in six Asian-
Pacific states (Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, South Korea); the Clean Technol-
ogy Fund where they have committed US$ 2 billion to fund the development and trans-
fer of clean energy technologies to developing countries; and a proposal (in partnership 
with the EU) to remove tariff and non-tariff barriers on the trade in environmentally and 
climate friendly goods and services.  
It is interesting to note that international climate policy is undertaken by the US Depart-
ment of State (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and that they take the lead in international 
negotiations in consultation with, among others, the Environmental Protection Agency, 




Given the geographical size and topographical diversity of the United States the vulner-
abilities to climate change vary greatly from region to region. While the National Re-
search Council and U.S. Global Change Research Program have taken regional variabil-
ity into account in their climate assessments they have also identified key areas of con-
cern for the United States in general based upon a range of 2.5 to 4 Celsius degrees of 
warming over the next century. These they have detailed in their document “U.S.  
                                                  
  http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/documents/2006-09-
27_AB32_GOV_NEWS_RELEASE.PDF. 
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Climate Action Report” which was also submitted to the UNFCCC as their National 
Communication. 
The most significant vulnerable domains addressed are agriculture and agricultural in-
dustry, forests and the timber industry, water resources, effects on coastal zones and ma-
rine fisheries, extreme temperature variations and human health. It is interesting to note 
that in comparison to other countries’ National Communications the US offers very little 
in the way of forward-looking numerical calculations and predictions on the expected 
impacts. Instead it simultaneously describes past and current trends in environmental 
changes, e.g. “Louisiana alone has been losing land at rates of about 68-104 square 
kilometres per year for the last 40 years…” (USDS, 2002) and outlines potential future 
impacts in general descriptive terms, e.g. “Projected changes in the amount, timing, and 
distribution of rainfall and snowfall are likely to lead to changes in the amount and tim-
ing of high and low water flows…”(ibid). This approach is partly a reflection of the un-
certainty in climate science, especially as applied to such a large geographic country but 
it also may be indicative of how the US views its vulnerability to climate change (see 
Perception of Affectedness below), and how they frame the problem of climate change. 
The US as stated takes a strong view that climate change is an issue of economic secu-
rity. Therefore when examining the vulnerabilities to potential changes in the natural en-
vironment they highlight in the National Communications the vulnerabilities of eco-
nomic sectors that are most dependent on the natural environment, namely agriculture, 
forestry and marine fisheries.  
Agriculture and the production of food and fibre commodities are, as the National Com-
munication describes, one of the cornerstones in US society and as a whole make up 
some 10% of the overall US economy. Moreover, agricultural productivity has continued 
to grow at a rate of approximately 1% a year since 1950s (USDS, 2002). Under the gov-
ernment’s climate change scenarios, barring any decline in agricultural technology or 
policy, productivity of the majority of their staple crops, is expected to increase in the 
next 100 years. Despite this expected growth the major threat to agriculture is the yearly 
regional variability and intensity of climatic events which could lead to water stress, soil 
erosion and destruction of crops. While these threats are unpredictable, the government 
takes the approach that they can be managed with the improvement of agricultural tech-
nologies. 
US forests make up over 30% of the territory and provide environmental services, rec-
reational and economic opportunities (the US is the world’s largest producer of wood 
products) as well as serve as carbon sinks (USDS, 2002). Under US climate scenarios, 
forest cover and especially commercial plots are expected to increase. Nevertheless, they 
are considered to be mainly under threat by drought, natural disasters, and invasive pest 
species. Perhaps one of the greatest threats of forests on socio-economic livelihoods is 
forest fires, which would appear to be on the increase in certain regions of the country 
(NIFC, 2008). 
Commercial and recreational fishing contributes approximately US$ 40 billion to the US 
economy each year (USDS, 2002). According to the National Communication, climate 
change has the potential to effect the population, spawning grounds, feeding grounds and 
migration of commercially important fish species both positively and negatively. For ex-
ample, the number of Pacific salmon is expected to decrease while populations of Pacific 
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sardines are expected to increase. While no further impact assessment is made for fisher-
ies the fact that it is addressed points to the fact that it is a considerable concern.  
-' .$
Given the well-publicized US position, we will limit our discussion here to a minimum. 
The US negotiating position under the Bush administration has been quite consistent 
over the years. From 2001 until 2007 they have vigorously opposed taking on binding 
emissions reductions targets firstly (though this opinion is changing) based on the posi-
tion that the science to attribute a change in climate to human activities was weak 
(AMJIL, 2008) and secondly that adopting such targets would have a significant nega-
tive effect on the US economy (White House, 2008); historically pursuing the logic that 
countries should be allowed to implement their own targets based on national strategy 
(AMJIL, 2008). Moreover, discussions on a post-2012 regime largely too met with resis-
tance from the US side. 
In the negotiations in Bali the US began to slightly alter its position appearing to take a 
more constructive and less hostile approach. On the one hand the opinion towards the 
climate science and causality of climate change has softened due in large part to the 
IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report),7and on the other the US appears to be more commit-
ted to helping construct a post-2012 climate regime (still however adhering to their sepa-
ratist bilateral and regional approach). They are still reticent about taking on binding 
emission reduction targets nonetheless and continued to insist that they will not accept a 
cap on emissions unless rapidly developing economies, in particular China and India, are 
also willing to do such. As has been stated, the US believes that the most viable manner 
in which to mitigate climate change is through technological innovation, this innovation 
however must not pose a threat to US commerce and trade. To that end the US was op-
posed to the position of China and the G77 in the discussion on technology transfer that 
Annex I countries make available climate mitigation technologies at below market value, 
preferring instead the creation and contribution to a climate technology fund to be man-







From an environmental perspective the perception of affectedness to climate change ap-
pears to be low. This is partly based perhaps on some of the political faction’s scepticism 
to the degree of which the climate is changing but more pronouncedly it is grounded on 
the US perception of optimism and current as well as continued technological advances 
to address physical and climatic problems. These perceptions are not only encapsulated 
in the higher echelons of the government, as is evidenced by President Bush’s remarks 
on climate change in his 2007 State of the Union address, “America is on the verge of 
technological breakthroughs that will… help us to confront the serious challenge of 
global climate change.” (White House, 2007), but also in how it presents its climate  
vulnerabilities in the national communications as well as climate change strategy. Look-
                                                  
7 See remarks of negotiators Watson and Dobriansky at COP 13 www.state.gov. 
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ing specifically at the 2002 National Communication, while many uncertainties are pre-
sented on the potential impacts much of the expected vulnerabilities and impacts are pre-
sented in such a manner that the problem can or will be mitigated through a technologi-
cal solution. One striking example of the overall tone which poignantly captures this 
view is on page 82 (in the section on Impacts and Adaptation) where it is stated that, 
“With either weak or strong warming… the US economy should continue to grow, with 
impacts being reduced…” (USDS, 2002). This statement we suggest underlines and re-
veals the fact that the US does not view climate change as a climate problem per se but 
as an economic one. Thus their main perception of affectedness is economic affected-
ness.  
The issue of economic affectedness for the US is two-fold, the first is how a change in 
climate will directly effect the US economy and industry and the second is how the cli-
mate negotiations, and in particular a post-2012 agreement will effect its economy. Ex-
amples of the first perception can again be derived form the US National Communica-
tion (apart from the quote above), whereby many statements in the impacts section make 
reference to impacts on US industry, most notably agriculture and forestry. Examples of 
the second can be derived from their negotiating position (as seen above) and the US’s 
desire to link the negotiations to policies on international trade, in particular two issues: 
offsetting border measures (carbon tariffs) and non-tariff barriers to trade in climate 
friendly technologies (see Brewer, 2008). In relation to carbon tariffs, the US feels that if 
the cost of energy is cheaper in countries that it directly competes with (China, India and 
Brazil) as a result of not taking on binding emission reduction targets that the price of 
foreign carbon intensive goods will be cheaper, putting the US at a competitive eco-
nomic disadvantage. Hence they advocate a tariff should be placed on such goods. In re-
lation to non-tariff barriers, the dynamics are as such. As noted, the US sees climate 
change as a dilemma that can be addressed in a technological manner and view them-
selves in a strong a position to develop and export such technologies (see section on per-
ceptions of opportunity). Non-tariff trade in these goods would be beneficial to US in-
dustries while conversely, if as has been advocated by China and the G77, that access to 
these technologies is, “related to [the] public good” (WSJ, 2006) and that access to US 
technologies be made available below their market value, the US will be at a competitive 
disadvantage.  
This framing of climate change as an economic and technological concern also shapes 
the US’s perceptions of opportunity. 
-1 (
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Since its founding, the Unites States has seen itself as the land of opportunity and since 
the 20th century a country that tries to capitalize economically and politically on dilem-
mas in the global arena. While the current administration might not outwardly be ex-
pressing the same social attention towards climate change as other nations it does view it 
as a means of furthering its own economic interests. Brewer (2008) in his review of US 
climate and trade policies highlights a number of initiatives that we feel underscore the 
US’s opportunistic economic position towards climate change. The most notable being 
the promotion of US technologies abroad that contribute to greenhouse gas mitigation, 
renewable energy and energy efficiency. Under the 2005 Energy Policy Act (PL 109-
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58), there is a provision that mandates the US Trade Representative to, “ (1) identify de-
veloping countries’ barriers to U.S. exports of greenhouse gas reducing technologies, (2) 
negotiate their removal, and (3) report to Congress annually on progress in achieving 
their removal” (as taken from Brewer, 2008). Furthermore, the 2007 Energy Independ-
ence Act (PL 110-104) calls for (1) the US Agency for International Development to ex-
plicitly support programs in developing countries that utilize US made products and 
technologies that address environmental issues, (2) calls for the US Commerce Depart-
ment to promote exports of “clean and efficient energy technologies” especially in China 
and India and, (3) asks for the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (an agency 
that helps US companies invest abroad) to give preferential treatment to US companies 
that use US technologies in the promotion of “clean and efficient energy technologies”.  
While this dynamic of promoting national commercial interests abroad is not by any 
means uncommon for a country, what is unique in this circumstance is that the US gov-
ernment has explicitly linked the promotion of economic commerce abroad to climate 
change, given the charge to promote these polices to the range of offices and agencies 
that deal in commercial overseas relations, and that this explicit linkage was debouched 
just after the Kyoto Protocol came into force. In an effort to implement this economic 
and climate agenda the Bush administration has entered into what it calls bilateral and 
regional partnerships with 15 countries and regional organizations. The partnerships are 
meant “to develop effective and science-based responses to the challenge of global cli-
mate change with friends and allies throughout the world” (USDS, 2008), which ostensi-
bly they do. However given the positions stated in the Energy Acts of 2005 and 2007, 





Given the relative strength of the US economy, historical levels of greenhouse gas emis-
sions and dominance of US culture, judging their perceptions of justice and equity in the 
international arena of climate change might at first appear to be a debatable endeavour, 
even though they accepted in 1992 the principle of common but differentiated responsi-
bilities. The common perception of the United States, especially since 2001, is that they 
are in the commanding position to address such concerns in other countries but have ne-
glected to do such. Be that as it may, if we are to gain a clearer profile of the US we must 
recognize that as with other countries in this report that the US too has its own percep-
tions within the post-2012 debate on climate change. These are directly related to their 
perceptions on affectedness and opportunity and we posit two-fold in nature. The first is 
the assurance of an equitable and fair economic arena in which to trade in climate tech-
nologies and services and the second is what we call ‘reverse equity’ where the US feels 
that as a result of its historical economic growth (tied to greenhouse gas emissions) and 
its now singular position in the world, it has been and will continue to be the bearers of 
economic prosperity and democracy to some developed nations.  
As has been discussed above, the United States, at present, primarily views the debate on 
climate change as an issue of economics. How they will be affected is cast in terms of 
economic growth and potential threats to industries; the opportunities to be capitalized 
upon relate directly to US trade and commerce. Concerns of equity and justice then re-
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volve around (as with many developing countries) the ability to maintain their develop-
ment if not on a “level playing field” then at least not from a position of disadvantage. 
This was made evident in 2001 when President Bush rejected the Kyoto Protocol stating 
that the United States at the time was facing economic difficulties (and a potential en-
ergy shortage) and that a cap on its own emissions while omitting developing countries 
would unduly burden the US economy. This position has not changed in the intervening 
years, from Montreal to Bangkok the US has insisted that if it is to take on binding emis-
sion reduction targets then so must its direct (developing country) economic competitors. 
This position was recently reinforced in President’s Bush’s remarks on climate change 
this past April.8 While this dynamic is certainly not new, it simply helps to re-illustrate 
the strong non-environmental perception the US holds in the climate negotiations and 
that if any leverage is to made it must be done form an economic perspective. 
The issue of reverse equity is indicative of how the US has viewed itself since the Sec-
ond World War. It is well detailed that since the 1940s the United States has perceived 
itself as the world’s political and economic leader and that it has a moral responsibility to 
transpose its values of democracy and justice for the development of other nations, thus a 
further detailed discussion of this perception is not necessary here. What is of relevance 
is that this perception is also applied to the debate on climate change and especially in 
the domain of technology transfer and trade. As we have seen above technology transfer 
and trade is the United States’ means of addressing the environmental impacts of climate 
change while at the same time boosting its economic balance sheet. Concurrently 
though, when looking at the topic through the lens of justice and equity, it is also the 
United States’ means of projecting its power to promote equity and justice. To this end 
and briefly, one need only consider the US$ 2 billion committed the Clean Technology 
Fund that, as the US climate policy document states, will “fund capacity building in de-
veloping countries” (USDS, 2007). Or President Bush’s recent remarks where he stated, 
“We must help countries in the developing world gain access to the technologies, as well 
as financing that will enable them to take a lower carbon path to economic growth”.9 The 
United States ability to project its power in such a manner is predicated in part on its past 
ability to expand industrially and economically due to cheap and abundant fossil fuel 
supplies, the same type of fuels that are at the root cause of the climate change. The ar-
gument can be made though that had the US not been able to develop as they have, they 
would not have been able to fulfil their moral responsibility in helping the rest of the 
globe develop; or in short, the United States’ development, based on fossil fuels has been 
and is the world’s development. Therefore the issues of equity propounded by countries 
such as India and China, that based upon the polluter pays principle the US should take 
the first step in adopting binding emission reduction targets to reverse the damage done 
and enable other countries to prosper are themselves reversed. The United States is and 
has been helping them and will continue to do so as long as it is in a position to do so. 
This overall perception is that imposing limits on America’s growth will have negative 
consequences for other countries.10 Much of the perceived arrogance of the US’s negoti-
                                                  
8 See www.whitehouse.gov, “President Bush Discusses Climate Change”, April 16, 2008. 
9 Ibid. 
10  For a more detailed discussion on the argument of what we call “reverse equity”, see Wall 
Street Journal, April 10, 2008 or Goklany, 2007. 
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ating position can be attributed to this issue, and if better understood might open up ave-
nues of opportunity for other parties. 





In this report, we have attempted to accomplish several tasks in a relatively short docu-
ment. Recognizing that the drive to reach a comprehensive post-2012 climate agreement 
represents an unstructured policy problem with a divergence of actors negotiating from 
different perspectives, we have sought to bring more methodological clarity on how to 
investigate a country’s actions within the post-2012 negotiations. Our first step was to 
create a policy perception framework. How countries act in negotiating an agreement is 
fundamentally based on a country’s socio-political and economic conditions and how 
they perceive the issue of climate change in light of those conditions. The framework is 
thus meant to serve as means of categorizing the dominant socio-political perceptions 
underpinning the climate change debate; namely the perceptions of justice and equity, 
perceptions of affectedness, and perceptions of opportunity. 
We then turned towards the application of the framework by creating country profiles of 
the most dominant actors within the post-2012 climate debate (Brazil, China, India, 
Mexico, Russia, South Africa, and the United States) based upon the key perceptions. 
The profiles are meant to serve two purposes: they are a gateway to understand where 
the countries currently stand vis-à-vis climate change in light of their perceptions, and 
secondly, they are to help identify (future) leverage points or issues that could be used to 
shift the individual negotiation positions of the countries towards accepting the so-called 
‘grand coalition’ post-2012 agreement.  
 
#




Perceptions of affectedness appear to be an issue in all case countries, perhaps with the 
exception of Russia. However, affectedness is addressed differently. While some coun-
tries focus on environmental affectedness (such as Mexico), others define affectedness in 
economic terms, such as the US. For some countries, the science of understanding cli-
mate vulnerabilities is limited, or research is just beginning, putting them in a position of 
greater uncertainty. Perceptions are thus not necessarily derived from their own experi-
ence. In this case we may think especially of India and to some degree China. 
For instance, where Mexico perceives it will be hit hard by climate change – taking the 
position that protection of the climate is in many regards more salient than economic 
growth – the US takes the stance that climate change mitigation, despite the perceived 
environmental consequences, poses a greater threat for their economy in terms of trade 
and technological development. South Africa, perhaps similar to the US, appears to be 
aware that climate change could have serious environmental impacts; however, concerns 
over the loss of its domestic fossil fuel energy supply dominate. Yet the South African 
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government is also aware that it cannot sit back and wait until other countries take ac-
tion. For India, domestic research investigating future climate impacts has just begun in 
earnest. While this has not mitigated their concern for taking action, it does perhaps sug-
gest that with greater knowledge, greater commitments could be expected. Similarly, 
domestic awareness of climate vulnerability in China is relatively recent. Like India, 
while climate change mitigation is an important issue on the Chinese political agenda, a 
deeper understanding of the potential impacts might serve to elicit more action. This, 
however, is buffeted by the fact that like South Africa, China has significant reserves of 
fossil fuels at its disposal, which it plans to exploit (barring any developments in clean 
energy technologies).  
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The perception of justice and equity is the most straightforward perception to emerge 
from our country profiles (with the exception of Russia that appears not to address the is-
sue). On the one hand, the United States propounds the discussion of ‘reverse equity’, 
stating that developing countries are now better off socially and economically as a result 
of the developed countries’ efforts at economic expansion and social development since 
the industrial revolution (especially that of the US). While developed countries may be 
seen as the sole cause of the problem, poorer nations are certainly a beneficiary. The ar-
gument of historical responsibility and of the need of the US to accept binding emissions 
reduction targets while large developing countries do not, is thus met with great scepti-
cism in the United States. 
Conversely, the remainder of our case study countries stand firmly behind the principle 
of common but differentiated responsibilities in the treaty, though in varying degrees, 
proclaiming that the US must increase mitigation efforts and fully engage in negotia-
tions. China, India and Brazil are perhaps the most outspoken on the issue, in part due to 
their leading roles in the G77. However, the root causes of developing countries’ percep-
tions of justice and equity are not uniform but would appear to stem from a panoply of 
reasons that are specific to each actor, including their understanding of the Rio Declara-
tion and the climate treaty. Nevertheless, three aggregate issues can be distilled to help 
elucidate this perception: issues of sovereignty, as with the case of Brazil and the Ama-
zon; issues of economic protection and gain, as is the case with Mexico’s oil industry or 
China’s (and to some degree India’s) rapidly growing economy; and issues of scientific 
uncertainty of how vulnerable a country is to climate change (affectedness). These issues 
then feed the perceptions that each actor is in some degree asked to do more than they 
perceive as fair or just.  

Unlike the perceptions of affectedness and justice and equity, the perception of opportu-
nity is perhaps the most difficult to generalize across countries. While it can be stated 
that for the majority of countries, perceptions of opportunity revolve around opportuni-
ties of financial or material gain, the perception on how these gains would be achieved 
varies. Moreover, beyond material gain there is the implicit (and sometimes explicit)  
expression of political opportunity to be realized within the negotiations. This enhance-
ment of political opportunity naturally feeds into the capitalization on material opportu-
nity. China, for example, portrays itself as a ‘leader’ of the G77 and attempts to that end 
Exploring the Socio-Political Dimensions of Climate Change Mitigation  91
frequently to set the negotiation agenda with what it (and others) see as the most salient 
issues; technology transfer being one of the most prominent. Brazil also takes on the 
mantle of ‘leader’ of South America, given its size and economy.  
Given the difficulties in making generalizations for this perception we will briefly high-
light the key points for each country individually. 
Brazil realizes the opportunities arising from its frontrunner status in biofuels production 
and use, and acknowledges the potential technological and financial benefits as a mature 
and stable host for CDM projects. Yet, to date, it seems to have perceived its rainforest 
more as a liability than an opportunity in the climate negotiations, ignoring the substan-
tial financial flows—and internal political impetus and support for effectively combating 
deforestation—that a REDD mechanism could provide.  
For India, CDM has great potential and to that end India perceives the CDM as the main 
opportunity within the climate domain that will help contribute to its economic growth. 
Its active participation in developing such projects is evidence of this.  
For Mexico, while climate protection is high on the agenda, the opportunities that result 
from it should address their main social concern, reducing and eradicating poverty. 
Within the climate realm, CDM along with technology transfer and free trade agree-
ments are perceived as the best vehicle.  
In China, CDM is seen as having great potential, and the opportunity for technology 
transfer (at discounted rates) appears to be the main driver of this perception.  
For South Africa, the main opportunity benefits lie within CDM as well as mainstream-
ing efforts in developing aid policies of developed countries, establishing multilateral 
mechanisms for technology transfer, and enhanced capacity building.  
For Russia, who was a critical actor in bringing the Kyoto Protocol into force, opportu-
nity in the post-2012 regime is not so apparent. While they certainly perceive themselves 
to be an important player it remains to be seen how much influence they will have. Nev-
ertheless, if Russia is to be included as a supporter of the grand coalition linking oppor-
tunities to issues outside the climate debate need to be explored further. Finally, for the 
United States the main opportunities it perceives are in the domain of enhanced trade 
agreements for the promotion of US technologies abroad. 
! ) 
 
With such a compilation of information as is contained in this report, many questions 
arise, and opportunities for future research present themselves. As stated above, this re-
port is meant to serve as a first step in identifying leverage points that could potentially 
enhance the amenability of countries to accept the EU’s ‘grand coalition’ proposal. Nev-
ertheless, being based primarily on a review of (English language) literatures, this report 
has not been able to comprehensively assess all key motivating factors for these coun-
tries. The distinctions that emerge are distinctions from a varied set of documents that do 
not lend themselves to making definitive judgments of any one actor. Moreover, in order 
to better identify potential leverage points there are several reasons that call for a much 
deeper examination of the positions of countries in the climate change arena: 
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• First, what individual negotiators say at international negotiations are their ‘negotiat-
ing’ positions and not necessarily what they would settle for. Studying these posi-
tions does often not reveal what their ‘reserve’ or fall-back negotiation position is. 
• Second, there is often a major divide between the foreign policy system of a country 
and what is actually happening within the country. Differences are motivated, for ex-
ample, by the desire to uphold certain (broader) principles in international negotia-
tions while still taking a pragmatic approach to problems domestically. 
• Third, countries are not unitary bundles of interests but represent considerable nego-
tiation processes between the different interests and sectors within them. Domestic 
power politics often leads to shifts in positions of countries, and understanding which 
ministry is in power domestically at a moment of time, may give better insights re-
garding the opportunities for creating an agreement. For example, agricultural and 
water ministries may have had far less clout vis-à-vis energy and economic minis-
tries in defining the climate agenda, but as water and food crises further develop, 
these ministries may also become more influential in shaping policies. 
• Fourth, countries face critical implementation bottlenecks that cannot be dealt with 
through catch-all universal phrases such as technology transfer, good governance and 
capacity building. Understanding the context-specific issue linkages is often a miss-
ing element in this research. 
• Fifth, many of these countries are federal democratic states (India, USA, South Af-
rica, Russia, Mexico), where power is shared differently with respect to different is-
sues between the federal authority and states. Such power sharing often implies that 
the federal authority has much less jurisdiction over some issues than the outside 
world may be tempted to think. 
• Sixth, even in a highly unitary government such as China, where mandates are not so 
scattered, there is still space for local level initiatives and action. Capitalizing on 
these is critical for moving the climate regime further. 
The nature of the questions addressed in this study therefore requires a more detailed re-
search effort that goes beyond a mere literature review. In a nutshell, a systematic as-
sessment of primary sources from the countries analyzed, including a series of semi-
structured interviews, is required to gain a more complete understanding of the driving 
forces behind a country’s negotiation position. Such more intense research can be de-
signed in a way that reduces costs, for example through focussed interviews at confer-
ences and workshops; through a more systematic assessment of national publications 
which can often be done through internet research; and through a more extensive review 
of the secondary literature on the countries studied (e.g., on the foreign policy system, 
the environmental policy system, the particular type of federal or centralized government 
system, etc.). Despite these options for an efficient research approach, a reduction in the 
number of countries studied might be advisable.  
Questions that could be addressed in a more intense research effort include, for example: 
1. What are the formal ‘aspirational’ and informal ‘reserve’ negotiating positions of 
countries in the international climate change regime? What are these positions in 
other fields of global governance? Can an understanding of the ‘reserve’ positions 
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and possible issue linkages to ‘aspirational positions’ in other fields of governance 
provide insights into how a future climate change regime can be constructed? 
2. What does an assessment of existing and planned relevant policies and their imple-
mentation reveal in terms of opportunities for further reduction of greenhouse gases? 
What instruments can be designed to deal with these challenges? 
3. What are the differences of opinions and interests between different ministries, sec-
tors and actors with respect to their country’s national and foreign policy on climate 
change? How can transnational sectoral and international agreements and instru-
ments be designed to account for, and build on, these differences? 
4. What are the key implementation bottlenecks in specific sectors and arenas within 
countries? How can these implementation bottlenecks be addressed in a way that 
mitigation of greenhouse gases can be accelerated? 
5. Given the global trend towards decentralization and pluralism, how effective is the 
‘state’ as entity in negotiating issues of global governance? Should issues be re-
centralized in order to empower states to more effectively negotiate, or should inter-
national inter-state governance be complemented by new forms of transnational gov-
ernance, such as public-private partnerships (with global reach)? 
These are just a sample of questions that could be addressed if we are to gain a more se-
rious understanding of how to move towards a more stable climate regime. 
 
In addition, there are a number of broader questions that are important but could not be 
sufficiently addressed within the limited scope of this study. 
1. First, this study has excluded the entire issue area of adaptation, regarding both local 
and national adaptation policies, and global adaptation governance. These questions, 
however, emerge as key issues on the national agenda of many countries, and in-
creasingly also on the international agenda, for example regarding climate refugees 
(Biermann and Boas 2007). A ‘grand coalition’ for climate governance will therefore 
have to seriously consider also the adaptation needs of countries. Only an explicit 
link between global mitigation and adaptation policies will bring the critical mass of 
countries needed for a successful climate governance architecture. 
2. Second, this study has looked at economic opportunities of countries largely in the 
climate negotiations. However, it is apparent that the ‘reach’ of the problem of man-
aging the carbon cycle goes far beyond current climate negotiations. An increasing 
literature addresses the relationship between climate and trade policies (Biermann 
and Brohm, 2005; Asselt and Biermann 2007), or between climate and food policies. 
Yet many other policies that are of pivotal relevance for mitigation of climate change 
as well as adaptation, are still outside the core of climate negotiations, and are likely 
to remain so. Thus, more research is needed to study the complex of ‘climate and…’ 
policies: unregulated or differently regulated areas of global and national governance 
that have important influence and repercussions for the climate problem. 
3. Third, this study hardly looked at methodological issues; in particular, it has not ad-
dressed issues on how political science research – for example on the foreign poli-
cies of countries – can contribute to climate policy research programmes that draw 
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on modelling and scenario work. Partially, this is addressed in other research projects 
jointly conducted by PBL and IVM-EPA. Partially, however, this methodological 
problematique will require increased efforts in bridging divides between computer-
based modelling groups and social science research. Avenues for such research could 
be, for example, linking different sectoral models with evidence-based research on 
the strength of different ministries and policy networks in (a majority of) countries. 
The development of a global architecture for adaptation, as a second example, will 
not be feasible without intense collaboration between natural sciences, scenario-
builders, and place-based social science research. 
In sum, this study has shed some light on important questions, but with each new find-
ing, new research questions emerged. The study showed the immense complexity once 
the ‘black box’ of the foreign policy of (major) countries is opened up, and it gave fur-
ther evidence that simplistic models based on rational unitary nation-state actors are not 
likely to provide reliable understanding of ongoing negotiations. However, given the 
limited resources and time available for this project, a large part of the research frontier 
had to remain unexplored.
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